Master's thesis in Geography

Human Geography
Development Geography

Who, What or Where is "Local"?

The Social Construction of the Local Level in the EU's Civilian Crisis Management

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2020

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Tiedekunta – Fakultet – Faculty	Osasto – Institution – Department
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Tutkielman otsikko – Avhandlings titel – Title of thesis

Who, What or Where is “Local”? – The Social Construction of the Local Level in the EU’s Civilian Crisis Management

Koulutusohjelma ja opintosuunta – Utbildningsprogram och studieinriktning – Programme and study track

Master’s programme in geography, Human Geography, Development Geography

Tutkielman taso – Avhandlings nivå – Level of the thesis	Aika – Datum – Date	Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
Master’s thesis	April 2020	104 + 1 appendix

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

The liberal peace paradigm focusing on a top-down approach and implementing Western values in a one-fits-all model dominated the field of peacekeeping and crisis management missions especially from the 1980s onwards. Later, local ownership became a “buzzword” in international interventions after some major failures of peacekeeping missions in the 1990s and early 2000s. Since then highlighting the relevance of the inclusion of local actors and of utilizing local knowledge have become inseparable parts of the major international organizations’ policy documents and strategies dealing with crisis management and peacebuilding.

However, the definition of who or where is local has not been adequately addressed. This has led to using the local as a concept referring to almost anything and everything within the borders of a state. The vague conceptualization has been criticized by scholars, as it leaves unanswered many questions about who can represent local interests or which actors should be included in a crisis management process to increase the sustainability of the intervention.

This Master’s thesis seeks research on who, what or where the local level is seen to be in the context of the EU’s civilian crisis management. It does it by uncovering and discussing discourses of the local level from a set of the EU’s documents dealing with civilian crisis management or external action more generally. In this thesis the local level is framed as a social construction through the notion of scale and level from human geographical literature. The human geographical literature also highlights the importance of not only looking at the discourses of the local level but also how it relates to other levels to gain a fuller understanding. The thesis also discusses the potential political opportunity structures that follow from these discourses.

There are three main discourses found in the documents focusing on who the local level comprises of: authorities and government, civil society and a variety of different actors on different levels within the nation. None of these discourses raises above the others. Instead, they co-exist, leaving the local level vaguely defined. It is argued that this gives the EU an opportunity to pick the local actors to cooperate with case-by-case. This choice can reflect the needs and will of the EU, the host country or both.

In addition, two discourses relating to what the local level represents more generally were discovered. These form a dichotomy: the local is seen both as a threat to the security of the EU citizens but simultaneously as a necessity to include in missions to increase the effectiveness of CSDP missions.

Overall, the importance of local ownership is highlighted throughout the documents. Considering this, the low level of mentions of local actors is somewhat surprising as well as the vague definition of who or where is local.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
local turn, hybrid peace, liberal peace approach, local ownership, civilian crisis management, crisis management, peacebuilding, political opportunity structures, CSDP, local level, scale, discourse analysis

Säilytyspaikka – Förvaringställe – Where deposited

HELDA

Muita tietoja – Övriga uppgifter – Additional information

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Tiedekunta – Fakultet – Faculty	Osasto – Institution – Department
Matemaattisluonnontieteellinen tiedekunta	Geotieteiden ja maantieteen laitos

Tekijä – Författare – Author

Johanna Hakanen

Tutkielman otsikko – Avhandlings titel – Title of thesis

Kuka, mitä tai missä on ”paikallinen”? – Paikallinen taso sosiaalisena konstruktiona EU:n siviilikriisinhallinnassa

Koulutusohjelma ja opintosuunta – Utbildningsprogram och studieinriktning – Programme and study track

Maantieteen maisteriohjelma, aluetiede, kehitysmaantide

Tutkielman taso – Avhandlings nivå – Level of the thesis	Aika – Datum – Date	Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages
Pro gradu -tutkielma	Huhtikuu 2020	104 + 1 liite

Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract

Liberaalin rauhan teoria ja siitä johdettu ylhäältä alas suuntautuva lähestymistapa kansainvälisiin interventioihin hallitsi rauhanturvaamista ja kriisinhallintaa etenkin 1980-luvulta alkaen. Paikallisesta omistajuudesta on kuitenkin tullut keskeinen avainkäsite interventiossa eräiden rauhanturvaoperaatioiden merkittävien epäonnistumisten myötä 1990- ja 2000-luvuilla. Siitä alkaen paikallisten toimijoiden mukaan ottamisen ja paikallisen tiedon hyödyntämisen tärkeyden korostamisesta on tullut erottamaton osa kansainvälisten organisaatioiden kriisinhallintaa ja rauhanrakentamista käsitteleviä dokumentteja.

Paikallisuuden tai kuka tai missä se on ei ole kuitenkaan kiinnitetty riittävästi huomiota. Tämä on johtanut siihen, että ”paikallinen” voi käsitteenä viitata lähes mihin tai keneen tahansa valtion rajojen sisällä. Etenkin akateemikot ovat kritisoineet tätä epämääräistä määritelmää, koska se jättää vastaamatta kysymyksiin siitä, kuka voi edustaa paikallisia tai mitkä toimijat tulisi sisällyttää kriisinhallintaan liittyviin prosesseihin, jotta intervention tulosten kestävyyttä voitaisiin parantaa.

Tämä pro-gradu tutkielma pyrkii tutkimaan, kuka, mikä tai missä paikallinen taso nähdään olevan EU:n siviilikriisinhallinnan kontekstissa. Tutkielmassa etsitään ja tarkastellaan paikalliseen tasoon liittyviä diskursseja tietyistä EU:n dokumenteista, jotka käsittelevät siviilikriisinhallintaa tai ulkopoliittista toimintaa yleisesti. Paikallisen tason käsitteleminen sosiaalisena konstruktiona johdetaan skaalaan ja tasoon liittyvästä ihmismaantieteen kirjallisuudesta. Kirjallisuus korostaa myös tarvetta tutkia paikallista tasoa rakentavien diskurssien lisäksi myös sitä, miten paikallinen taso esitetään suhteessa muihin tasoihin. Tämän kautta pystytään muodostamaan kokonaisvaltaisempi kuva. Tutkielma tarkastelee myös sitä, minkälaisia poliittisia mahdollisuusrakenteita diskurssit voivat tuottaa.

Analyysin tuloksena on kolme päädiskurssia siitä, keistä paikallinen taso koostuu: viranomaiset ja hallinto, kansalaisyhteiskunta ja monista eri toimijoista eri tasoilla valtion sisällä. Yksikään näistä diskursseista ei nouse toisia keskeisemmäksi. Ne ovat olemassa rintarinnan, jättäen paikallisen tason määrittelyn hyvin ympäripyöreäksi. Tämän nähdään jättävän EU:lle mahdollisuus valita paikallisia toimijoita yhteistyökumppaneiksi tapauskohtaisesti. Valinta voi heijastella EU:n, paikallisen valtion tai molempien tarpeita ja tahtoa.

Näiden lisäksi aineistosta löydettiin kaksi diskurssia, jotka liittyvät laajemmin siihen, mitä paikallinen taso edustaa. Nämä muodostavat dikotomian: paikallinen taso nähdään samanaikaisesti sekä uhkana EU:n kansalaisten turvallisuudelle että välttämättömänä osana sisällyttää missioihin, jotta niiden tehokkuutta voidaan lisätä.

Kokonaisuudessaan paikallisen omistajuuden keskeisyyttä korostetaan läpi dokumenttien. Tämä huomioiden onkin yllättävää, kuinka vähän paikallisiin toimijoihin viitataan sekä kuinka ympäripyöreäksi paikallisuuden määritelmä dokumenteissa jätetään.

Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords
paikallisuus, paikallinen omistajuus, hybridi rauha, liberaalin rauhan teoria, siviilikriisinhallinta, kriisinhallinta, rauhanrakennus, poliittiset mahdollisuusrakenteet, YTPP, paikallinen taso, skaala, diskurssianalyysi

Säilytyspaikka – Förvaringställe – Where deposited

HELDA

Muita tietoja – Övriga uppgifter – Additional information

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
COREPER	Committee of the Permanent Representatives
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
EUD	EU Delegation
EEAS	European External Action Services
EU	European Union
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
HoM	Head of Mission
MS	Member State
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
Nato	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
SSR	Security Sector Reform
EUSR	Special Representative
UN	United Nations

1 INTRODUCTION

Crisis management and peacekeeping missions have been a part of the peace and security toolboxes of international organizations since 1948 when the United Nations (UN) deployed its first operation to observe the cease-fire during the Israeli-Arab conflict. After that, the number of international and regional organizations taking part in various forms of peace-building, crisis management, and peacekeeping has gradually increased. These organizations now also include the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), for example.

Simultaneously, the number of types, forms and purposes of these operations has also extended well beyond the original monitoring and observing tasks to include everything from different kinds of civilian missions to full-scale military operations. Moreover, coordination and cooperation with humanitarian and development organizations have been added to the repertoire of international and regional organizations (Rintakosti & Autti, 2008). Despite the varying forms, drivers and terminologies of different organizations and missions, especially since the beginning of 1990's many of the crisis management operations carried out or financed by major international organizations have been based on very similar concepts, framed under the liberal peace paradigm (Mac Ginty, 2010; Miklian, 2014).

In short, the liberal peace paradigm follows the idea of the democratic peace theory and promotes establishing liberal democracies as a one-size-fits-all solution to create sustainable peace all over the world, as liberal democracies are seen as less likely to wage war between one another. Though there were also critical voices, in practice the liberal peace paradigm received only slim contestation from practitioners as the ideal of crisis management and peacebuilding missions during its first decade of implementation (Miklian, 2014; Schierenbeck, 2015).

However, accompanied by an increasing realization of how ineffective and even counterproductive many crisis management and peacekeeping missions have been (see for example Mac Ginty, 2010; Miklian, 2014; Schierenbeck, 2015), many scholars have started to argue for alterations to the paradigm. Some scholars also strongly maintain that to improve crisis management, we need to leave the liberal peace paradigm behind completely (Paffenholz,

2015; Randazzo, 2016). Despite this, the idea of promoting Western ideals continues to be the approach of many operations and other interventions implemented under international organizations (Mac Ginty, 2010; Miklian, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015).

The criticism towards the liberal peace paradigm is diverse, but one of the key components of the critical discourse has focused on the lack of local participation and agency in all phases of the missions, as well as the limited understanding of the individual contexts these missions are operating in, for example. This has led to what is called "the local turn" in peacebuilding and crisis management. The local turn highlights the importance of the local ownership, participation, knowledge and culture as key aspects to be included and emphasized in any international intervention. It also stresses the need for tailor-made solutions for each crisis, instead of the more generic models sought after previously, as well as highlights the need to go beyond the state-level in the search for local participation (Lederach, 1997; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; Randazzo, 2016). The local turn has two different, but also complementary sides to it. First, it can be understood as an emancipatory aspect, and second, as an aspect increasing the effectiveness of international interventions (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015).

The local turn is not a new phenomenon. The rationale behind it, as well as some key concepts, such as "local participation" and "empowerment" have been in the use of development cooperation organizations since the 1980s and 1990s (Kuehne, Pietz, von Carlowitz, & von Gienanth, 2008). Judging by the increased number of mentions of "local" in strategies and other documents, the message seems to have been received by major international organizations, such and the UN and the EU. For example, UN's An Agenda for Peace report from 1992 has no mention of the word "local", whereas the UNDP's 2011 Governance for Peace document uses the term almost 200 times (Mac Ginty, 2015). Practices towards it seem to vary quite largely, however. Often, concepts such as "local agency" and "local ownership" are used as catchphrases in policy papers, though the implementation of these concepts would be at a rather low level or inconsistently applied in crisis management and peacebuilding missions (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Overall, it is very clear that questions of local ownership and participation have become central to crisis management and peacebuilding (Donais, 2009).

Interestingly, though the word “local” is often mentioned, it is rarely specifically defined. It is also a concept whose definition has received rather slim attention within academic literature on the local turn, though “local” is unquestionably a central term within the discourse (Kuehne et al., 2008; Mac Ginty, 2015). Is ”local” a synonym for national, or does it refer to grass-root actors only? Can it be both? Or is it perhaps something that is case-dependent, and if so, how is it defined case-by-case? What kind of themes or aspects fall under the local level or category?

It is important to define what is meant with the local level because it can help answer questions, such as who has access to the local, how much power does the local level have, and in what kind of matters is the local level addressed (Mac Ginty, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). These, in turn, are important questions when assessing the local level and its significance and bearing in peacebuilding and crisis management. It is also important to assess and investigate the meanings behind the concepts that are in use because using imprecise or heterogenic concepts eats away their legitimacy (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017). Moreover, Kuehne et al. (2008) point out that defining concepts such as “local” or “local ownership” incompletely can lead to interpretations, which effectively abuse the core meaning of the concepts for political purposes.

Fields relating to the study of international relations often, though not always, seem to use “the local” as an intuitive concept, leaving it without a precise definition, or defining it by pointing to specific locations, institutions or actors as fixed levels of analysis (Delaney & Leitner, 1997). Bräuchler and Naucke (2017) maintain that one reason why, for instance, peace and conflict studies has not produced many precise definitions of the local is because it has traditionally strived for generic or universal theories. This can be hard to fit well together with the aspiration to highlight “authentic” locality and the local level in general, as they tend to vary case-by-case.

Beyond the field of international relations studies, “local” is also an often-used term in geography. Within geography there are numerous ways to define local. Often, it is treated rather similarly to international relations: a level on a scale, which is nested, hierarchical and fixed in size. This definition is especially used in physical geography, as well as cartography and geographic information science, for example (McMaster & Sheppard, 2004). In human geography, “local” also refers to a scalar level. However, human geography includes scholars who draw their views on levels and scale from a poststructuralist approach. They view

scalar levels as socially constructed through discourse and practices, along with the larger-scale structure it is a part of (Marston, 2000). This makes scale and level thought-provoking concepts in the case of looking into how the local is defined in the context of crisis management and what kind of meanings are attached to it.

In human and political geography, scales and levels have been used as key concepts in studies focusing on uncovering power relations and political opportunity structures, for example (Howitt, 1998; Marston, 2000). Consequently, what makes scales interesting is that from this viewpoint of scales drawn from human geographers, scales and levels can be viewed as the embodiment of social relations, displaying empowerment and disempowerment. They can be researched as the arena in which these social relations take place (Swyngedouw, 1997, pg. 169). Therefore, as Sallie A. Marston has stated: "*As geographers, then, our goal concerning scale should be to understand how particular scales* [or more specifically: levels, and the local level in particular in this case] *become constituted and transformed in response to social-spatial dynamics*" (Marston, 2000, pg. 221, clarification added).

In addition to the view of scales as social constructs and, thus, embodiments of social relations, geography also highlights that levels are inherently linked to each other within a scale. They are constructed in relation to one another (see for example Howitt, 1998). Therefore, besides studying the discourses related to the local level, it is interesting and valuable to also look at how the local level discourses relate to those on other relevant levels. Likewise, observing how the relations between these levels, meaning the scale, is socially constructed can give interesting insights and open-up more information about the construction of the level this thesis focuses on; the local.

Apart from level and scale, another concept I find helpful and interesting to incorporate in this thesis is political opportunity structures. Put shortly, political opportunity structures point to those characteristics of an institution or other contexts, which determine the requirements or abilities for outside actors or other interest groups to have an impact in decision-making (Berclaz & Giugni, 2005; Princen & Kerremans, 2008). Thus, they further highlight why the social constructions of the local level can have such an immense effect on the opportunities for local ownership. This thesis will not dive deep into the concept or the theories behind it but find it very useful to deliberate the effects of social constructions. It is interesting to not merely look at the definition of the local level, but also to discuss what kind of consequences the definition may carry.

These topics of local ownership in crisis management and peacebuilding can be quite complex, but they are interesting to study. I maintain that in order for the local ownership to gain a better foothold in practice, there needs to be more research on what the local is, though this alone will not solve the challenge. These themes are something I became very interested in while working as an intern at one of the EU's civilian crisis management missions in 2019. The EU has highlighted the importance of local ownership in its interventions for years, but the implementation is often seen as less than successful (see for example Ejdus, 2017). During my internship I paid attention to things such as the ratio between foreign and local workforce, which leaned very heavily on the foreign side. This is a commonly seen characteristic of many of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. It is not a simple question to answer, but one can wonder, whether true local ownership would require a more balanced ratio. In addition, in some projects where locals were involved heavily throughout the process, this was not always portrayed as being so in the public communications, as the actions were framed in terms of what the mission did.

I am not implying that the locals had no agency or ownership or that the mission functions mainly on principles disregarding locals. My observations and mental remarks certainly also included those, which highlighted local agency and empowerment. I also fully realize that my position only allowed quite shallow observations. Moreover, questions relating to local ownership and the local turn, in general, are far from simple, as I have demonstrated above. But the questions these mental remarks raised in my mind made me highly motivated to explore these topics further through the means of this thesis. Furthermore, focusing the study on civilian crisis management is justifiable by the fact that most of the current EU's CSDP operations are civilian missions, which also seems to be a continuing trend in the future.

Therefore, this thesis is an attempt to address the question of what is "the local" in the context of the EU's civilian crisis management missions and discuss, what are the opportunity structures that might arise from these discourses. The purpose is to view, what is the local level is as a socially constructed space in the arena of a larger scale. How the local level is constructed and what kind of associations it includes affects the opportunities and obstacles for the participation of the local actors. It is argued that the social construction of the local level defines which local actors are seen as relevant and legitimate counterparts in civilian crisis management missions.

1.1 The Research Frame and the Structure of the Thesis

This thesis takes the above as its starting point and seeks to investigate, how the local is conceptualized and what kind of discourses are used of it by the EU in the context of civilian crisis management. It also seeks to discuss what kind of opportunity structures for local involvement the discourses may contain. It does so by utilizing the concepts of scale and level from human geographical literature, taking a primarily poststructuralist approach to these concepts. It analyzes how the local is defined and discussed and what kind of issues or aspects are seen as relevant aspects of the local. Moreover, it looks into what are some of the other relevant levels on this scale and how they relate to the local level. The main research question stated as follows:

> *What is the local level like as a social construction in the context of EU civilian crisis management?*

In addition, a question of interest to be discussed and considered is:

> *What kind of opportunity structures for local involvement may arise from the identified social constructions of the local level?*

The next section of this Introduction will briefly look into the history of the relationship between geographical research and peace and conflict studies to build a picture of how this thesis is situated in the field of geographical research. The last section of the chapter will then introduce some key concepts. After that the second and third chapters focus on the theoretical underpinnings and framework used in this thesis. The second chapter of the thesis pursues to build a deeper understanding of three approaches or paradigms of crisis management: liberal peace, the local turn and hybrid peace. The third chapter builds an overview of the human geographical theory of scale and levels. The third chapter also presents the concept of political opportunity structures, which further stresses why it is important to critically asses how the local level is defined and what kind of aspects or roles are emphasized in these discourses.

The fourth chapter then moves on to introduce the context of this thesis: the EU's civilian crisis management. This is followed by the fifth chapter presenting the materials and methods used in this thesis. The analysis is based on EU documents, which are examined by using discourse analysis. And finally, the sixth chapter focuses on the analysis and results, whereas the final, seventh, chapter turns the attention to the discussion of thesis process, some of its limitations, and further themes for research.

1.2 Geographical Research, Peace and Conflict

Geography is an integral part of any conflict or crisis. It is equally fundamental to sustaining peace (Mamadouh, 2005). Therefore, it is also a discipline worth utilizing when looking into research questions of peace and conflict. In a narrow outlook of geography, this could be understood as researching the limitations, opportunities or options provided by physical geographic features. While this might be interesting from a military strategic or tactical point of view, for example, it overlooks another important dimension: political geographies that are both shaping and being shaped by processes and phenomena related to peace and conflict (Flint, 2006).

Initially, most geographers focusing on issues related to international relations and conflicts were more prone to focus on war rather than peace. They viewed war as a "natural" phenomenon and a legitimate expression of rivalry between states. However, the strong tradition of peace research evoked by the Cold War period and the looming threat of nuclear war convinced more geographers to become active in addressing questions of peace and the potential of geographical research in achieving and sustaining it. Since then, the input of geographers into these academic and practical discourses has been on both sides: addressing themes relating to peace and its sustainability, as well as researching and developing more efficient ways to conduct military activities, for example (Kobayashi, 2009).

Within geography, there are various concepts and approaches through which one can study both war and peace (Flint, 2006), but in this thesis, I have chosen one concept in particular to investigate my research topic: scale. I make a distinction between scale and level, though they are often used as synonyms. Both Flint (2006) and Kobayashi (2009) see scale, with which they point to both scale and level, as one of the central geographical concepts explaining conflict and evaluating its effects. Flint (2006) further maintains that one of the benefits

of a scalar analysis is that it can unveil the constraints and opportunities for local action, highlight interactions between processes, and underline the role of agency in producing wider structures. Kobayashi (2009, pg. 822) also states that "*scale is also important in understanding the complex sets of discourses through which conflict is initiated, sustained, and resolved, from local conflicts to global international geopolitics*." I would, therefore, also argue that the three benefits of scalar analysis mentioned by Flint are not specific to studying only causes of violent conflict and war, but also apply to use scalar analysis as a tool for researching phenomenon related to interventions to prevent or stop the conflict.

However, browsing through geographical literature about scales and conflict, there seems to be a tendency to use the scale as a simple construction of levels of analysis, in which the levels are taken for granted. This is a definition of scale and levels often used in physical geography, for instance. However, there is a more complex side of the scale literature focusing on the social construction of the levels (Agnew, 1994; Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Howitt, 1998; McMaster & Sheppard, 2004; Sayre, 2005; Howitt, 2008; Herod, 2011), which I apply in this thesis. This side of the scale theories does not seem to be a very common focus in the geographical literature related to scale and conflict. A large body of the scale and conflicts literature in geography also focuses on the root causes of conflicts, and not as much on the crisis management missions or peace operations (see for example Mamadouh, 2005; Flint, 2006). Within the mission-oriented literature, the focus has traditionally been on military missions.

As explained above, in this thesis I aspire to utilize scale theories to investigate the local level as a social construction in the context of processes and actors related to civilian crisis management operations, and thus contribute to the geographical discourse from an angle, which is not as common. However, before going further into the theoretical foundations of this thesis, the next section of this thesis turns to an overview of the key concepts.

1.3 Key Concepts

This thesis is all about vague concepts, which are often used interchangeably and sometimes in manners. This can confuse the reader. Therefore, before I move further, I will briefly elaborate on the definitions of some key concepts and how I use them in this thesis.

1.3.1 Crisis Management and Peacebuilding

Crisis management is one of the most often mentioned concepts in this thesis. However, the theoretical sections of this thesis also refers the concept of peacebuilding, for example, because these concepts are sometimes used interchangeably within the literature of peace and conflict studies. Both refer to outside interventions aiming to stabilize a conflict or post-conflict state. Peacebuilding can be defined as actions "*... addressing structural issues and the long-term relationships between conflictants.*" (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011, pg. 32).

It is, a narrower approach than crisis management missions, which are broadly defined by the EU as *"... joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military advice and assistance, and conflict prevention and peacekeeping, including post-conflict stabilisation."* (Xavier & Rehl, 2017, pg. 78). Thus, the EU distinguishes between civilian crisis management and military crisis management. The context of this thesis focuses on civilian crisis management, which is an EU concept and will be elaborated in chapter 4.

These concepts of crisis management and peacebuilding have differing but also overlapping definitions. As the literature on approaches to crisis management introduced in Chapter 4 does not refer to only crisis management, but also peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, the chapter also refers to all of these concepts. Further on in the thesis, the focus is set more specifically on the EU's civilian crisis management missions, and so is the terminology used in the thesis.

1.3.2 Scale and Level

When looking into the literature related to the concept of scale, one can hardly avoid running into another concept: level. These concepts are often used as synonyms (Gibson, Ostrom, & Ahn, 2000; Sayre, 2005), which is especially common in geographical research (Sayre, 2005). Marston et al. (2005), whose works have been very significant in human geography, seem to use the concepts "level" and "scale" interchangeably. They point out that scale can mean either size or level, which often causes confusion and impreciseness to the analytical use of the concepts. Likewise, another key scale-scholar Swyngedouw (1997) also uses the term "scale" to refer to both scalar structures and configurations as well as individual scalar levels, such as local or regional. However, I have opted to use them as separate, though

closely connected concepts, as I find them to be more useful and clear this way. To avoid further confusion within this thesis, I will explain my definition and the difference between the two concepts.

There are at least a couple of slightly different variations in definitions, which distinguish scale and level from each other. Sayre (2005), for example, opens the concept of scale and divides it into two dimensions; epistemological moment and the ontological moment. The epistemological moment is defined through the resolution and extent of the study area. It is viewed as the technical-methodological sense of scale. This is what Marston et al. (2005) refer to as scale as size. The ontological moment is described as the technical sense of scale. This moment is further divided and defined as comprising of scale and level. Level is the location of organization or observation, whereas scale is the processes and relations among actors on levels (Sayre, 2005).

In another article, Gibson et al. (2000) give a slightly altering, though not completely dissimilar, distinction between the two concepts. For them, scales are the dimensions used to measure and study any phenomenon. These dimensions can be spatial, temporal, and quantitative or analytical. In geography, the focus has typically been on spatial scales. Levels, on the other hand, are defined as the units of analysis, located at different positions on a scale (Gibson et al., 2000).

The definition used in this thesis leans heavily on those of Sayre (2005) and Gibson et al. (2000) presented above. In this thesis I describe *scale as the full structure including relations and processes, whereas levels are the distinct positions on it*. For instance, if one thinks of scale as a ladder, which is a common metaphor used in describing it, the whole ladder is the scale and the rungs are the levels on it. The names of the levels as well as the form of the scale varies from case to case, and is under constant restructuration, as will be described in the following section.

2 APPROACHES TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The ideas and practices of the liberal peace approach were first brought up in the 1980s by scholars such as Michael Doyle (Miklian, 2014), though it was not until the end of the Cold War when the paradigm grew its popularity to a level where it was the prime ideology behind

most international organizations' crisis management and peacebuilding initiatives. Over time, however, the paradigm has become increasingly criticized, as it has failed to deliver expected results such as sustainable peace, with some missions reaching very few or none of their objectives (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

A major component of this criticism has focused on the lack of involvement and agency of locals in the missions as well as the state-centrality of the interventions. Subsequently, another paradigm, local turn, emphasizing the importance and value of the local level involvement and ownership has emerged (Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Since then a third approach combining the two previous has developed. It is called hybrid peace (Mac Ginty, 2010; Tardy, 2014). This chapter focuses on presenting arguments for and against increasing local inclusion in peacebuilding and crisis management operations. However, it will first look into what was, and many would argue still is, the most influential paradigm within the field of international interventions, liberal peace, as it is essential to understand the context from which the local turn and hybrid peace have evolved. These notions will serve as the basis upon which the analysis of the materials is built on further on in this thesis.

2.1 The Liberal Peace Paradigm

In brief, the liberal peace paradigm is a concept combining peace with liberal market policies and democracy. More specifically, the components of liberal peace usually include largely Western ideals of democratization, free markets, human rights, the rule of law, and neoliberal development (Paris, 2004: 40 - 51; Richmond, 2006; Mac Ginty, 2010). In continuation, the liberal peace paradigm maintains that peace or stability can be attained and sustained through establishing structures and principles of a liberal democracy and encouraging interdependence through trade ties. In practice, this is done via peacebuilding and crisis management operations based on, and more importantly advocating for, Western structures and principles of liberal democracy in weak, failed and developing states (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 129 - 132; Miklian, 2014).

The liberal peace paradigm is an extension of the democratic peace theory, which argues that democratic states are more unlikely to engage in a conflict between each other (Mac

Ginty, 2010; Miklian, 2014). This was also the foundational idea behind the creation of institutions such as the EU and the UN, and it gained more popularity after the end of the Cold War and the surge of intra-state conflicts that followed (Miklian, 2014). Previously, most conflicts had been interstate, whereas the "new" conflicts at the time were various types of intra-state crises, which still carried cross-boundary effects (Paris, 2004: 40 - 51; Coning & Friis, 2011; Ricigliano, 2012; Egnell, 2013; de Coning & Friis, 2015). Since then, the trend of more civil conflicts has continued, though many civil wars have become highly internationalized, meaning that they have ever-more complicated international and regional connections (see for example Strand, Rustad, Urdal, & Nygård, 2019).

The transformation of conflicts and their increasing complexity also brought with it a change to mainly civilian victims, as well as vast amounts of refugees. Internally displaced people, which have since become trademarks of violent conflicts. Past conflicts were mainly fought at battlefronts, whereas in many of the more current conflicts, there is no clear front. Instead violent incidents can take place at almost any place, any time and civilian sites have become common targets. In addition, most conflicts do not have a clear starting date or event, and instead sort of "bubble-up" to reach a critical level at some point (Anderson, 1999: 11 - 15; Paris, 2004: 40 - 51; de Coning, 2008).

These new types of conflicts were a big part of why academics started urging state and non-state actors to apply the principles of the liberal peace framework into crisis management and peacebuilding initiatives since the 1980s. By then, scholars roughly agreed on three findings concerning the liberal peace paradigm. First, liberal democracies are unlikely to wage war amongst each other; second, interdependence created by strong trade ties further reduces the likelihood of conflict; and, third, these characteristics do not mean that democratic states would avoid conflict altogether. Studies have found that liberal-democratic states have been more likely to engage in conflict with autocracies than others (Miklian, 2014). Despite the last finding, a liberal peace scheme was seen as the key to building sustainable peace in the era of the intra-state conflicts.

Policymakers in both governmental and non-governmental organizations were also quick to adopt the ideas of the liberal peace paradigm, as it gained both the sympathy of the general public as well as funding opportunities. Therefore, policies and responses to conflict situations and weak or vulnerable states were modified to focus on the first two findings on liberal peace: that democracies are unlikely to engage in war amongst one another and that trade-

interdependence also reduces the likelihood of conflict. A third assumption that was embedded in the policies was that it is the duty of more developed states to support and help weaker states as much as they could to reach these goals. This, accompanied by the increased funding, brought a surge of actors into the field of interventions and initially increased the number of approaches used to tackle crises through interventions. However, discussions about different strategies and focuses soon crystallized into a one-size-fits-all policy, which emphasized the superiority of Western knowledge and practice of liberal democracy and its institutions over the locals' practices and culture (Mac Ginty, 2010; Miklian, 2014; Schierenbeck, 2015). This was later seen as a major flaw, as will be shown below, though the question is far from simple.

Though the liberal peace paradigm is closely linked with universalist ideas of priorities that sustain peace, it can be applied in different graduations or models: conservative, orthodox and emancipatory. The conservative model is composed of a strict top-down approach to interventions and coercive measures tend to be in play. The orthodox model has more interest on the local level and local ownership, but still views the methodologies and norms of the intervener as superior. Interventions can, therefore, have both top-down and bottom-up features. The emancipatory model, on the other hand, is critical towards the coerciveness and conditionality of the two other models and calls for consent, negotiated implementation and local ownership (Richmond, 2006). I maintain that the last graduation is closely connected, or even parallel, to the hybrid peace approach introduced in later in this chapter.

The way and mode in which the liberal peace paradigm and its' different dimensions are expressed in a peacebuilding or crisis management mission often rests on the priorities and will of the central states taking part or funding the activities, as well as the capacities of the actors directly involved in the mission. Different actors may also have different approaches, and the approaches may also vary between different phases of the conflict. According to case studies, the models of international interventions, such as crisis management missions, tend to be more of what Richmond described as conservative, though their stated objectives are towards the orthodox model (Richmond, 2006).

Despite the dominance of external powers in the previous and many current operations, the local level actors should not be seen as static, passive or completely powerless, as they have been able to make an impact on these missions (see for example Richmond, 2006;

Schierenbeck, 2015). However, as the next section highlights, despite the different approaches to the liberal peace paradigm, the inclusion of the local level has not been sufficient according to many scholars. They argue for a need to alter the dominant paradigm in crisis management and peacebuilding, and some have even declared "a crisis of the liberal peace" (Paffenholz, 2015; Randazzo, 2016; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017).

Though the initiatives implementing the liberal peace paradigm might have meant well, they have been severely hindered by several factors, such as competing political strategies of contributing states, NGOs competing over resources, overlapping activities, as well as overlong delays caused by bureaucracy (Miklian, 2014). Another point the liberal peace paradigm that has received criticism on is its state-centrality (Mac Ginty, 2015). The central status of the state in peacebuilding and crisis management issues is the result of numerous global developments, which have delocalizing effects. These include modernization, globalization and urbanization, for instance (Mac Ginty, 2015; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017).

As the liberal peace approach advocates for universal solutions (Schierenbeck, 2015), the institutions seen as most important to support to create peace and stability are most often those of the state. A great deal of the society and their experience can be, thereby, excluded from the peace process. Though the role and importance of the state level is unquestionable, it can also be argued that it should not be the sole level of interest (O'loughlin & Anselin, 1991; Agnew, 1994; Buzan, 1995; Claval, 2006; Williams, 2011).

A state-central view is not common only in the liberal peace paradigm but also in the wider field of international relations, in which the centrality of the national or state level has been quite wide-spread, though not universal. At least previously, many studies of international relations have treated their subjects of research as though they existed in a spatial vacuum (O'loughlin & Anselin, 1991). Instead of analyzing phenomena as multi-level issues, many researchers have focused their research on a fixed and stable state level without much reasoning (O'loughlin & Anselin, 1991; Agnew, 1994). However, especially with processes such as globalization, for example, some of the power traditionally held by the states has been handed to other entities on different levels (Claval, 2006), increasing the need for researchers to widen their focus to other levels as well. Simultaneously, a growing realization and understanding of the complexities and connections between and among human and non-human processes, as well as individual levels calls for views expanding over the limits of one level.

Moreover, intervening and attempting to implement liberal democratic structures without adequate consideration of the historical, political and cultural context of the host state can lead to a vast array of problems (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg.129–132). For instance, democratization completed as a reaction to, and through an enforcement by, external pressure can lead to the process legitimizing the rule of a single party or a dominant ethnic group. Cases such as these can be contributors to conflict rather than peace (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg. 129–33; Ricigliano, 2012). Furthermore, by maintaining to promote primarily Western structures and ideals, the liberal peace paradigm also overlooks the potential of local level solutions based on their non-western traditions and assigns the dominant Western concepts a superior status (Miklian, 2014). Some scholars view this as a continuation of western hegemony and colonial heritage (Richmond, 2006; Paffenholz, 2015; Randazzo, 2016). These criticisms have acted as a stimulus for the local turn, which will be cover next.

However, before I move to the next section covering the local turn, I would like to highlight that many scholars, as well as practitioners, maintain that having a democratic regime, political stability, development accompanied by sufficient prosperity, as well as accountability and legitimacy of governance can indeed lower the risk of conflict between and within states (see for example Paris, 2004, pg. 40–51; Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg. 129–133; Ricigliano, 2012). Some also argue that the main the components of liberal peace paradigm provide the ability to emancipate people, who would not necessarily have the resources to emancipate themselves in a context with a strong but small group of local powerholders (see for example Mac Ginty, 2010).

There are also clear challenges related to local ownership and participation. These include resource dependency and opposing views of different groups, for example. I will present some of these challenges at the end of this chapter. Therefore, as easy as it may be to criticize the liberal peace paradigm, the suggested “fixes” or alternatives to it also include a variety of challenges and problems. Moreover, though an intervention may cause harm, it is not necessarily a reason not to intervene, as not intervening might cause even greater damage (Anderson, 1999, pg. 1–2). This can be a very difficult subject to evaluate.

2.2 The Local Turn

In general, it can be said that while interventions and other efforts towards supporting or establishing peace grew more complex especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, taking on various tasks related to state-building in attempts to address the transformation of conflicts, the criticism towards these efforts also increased and grew louder (Mac Ginty, 2010). Especially since the now widely recognized failures of the international interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, the liberal peace paradigm started receiving more criticism from both academia and practitioners focused on crisis management and peacebuilding. The most vivid criticisms deal with the state-centrality of many initiatives and ideas, as well as how poorly the local level has been given ownership or agency (Randazzo, 2016).

Both of these criticisms are related to the fact that the international organizations were seeking to push out a one-fits-all solution to stabilize conflict, or post-conflict, areas and focused on international rather than local capabilities (Kuehne et al., 2008; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). Simultaneously with the realization amongst many scholars that the tools used in interventions were not tackling many issues related to interstate conflicts, some scholars were also drawing more focus on the role of the civil society in peacebuilding and crisis management (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

Together these two, the failure of intervention tools to address interstate violence and the growing emphasis on "peace from below", provided the basis for what became to be known as the local turn in peacebuilding and crisis management. The local turn was also boosted by the shift towards human security, which was promoted especially by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The human security perspective broadened the scope of security to include freedom from fear and want (Pirozzi, 2013). As many national security agendas had failed to deliver these sustainably and adequately, the relevance of the local level was emphasized, supporting the need for a local turn further (Mac Ginty, 2015).

In short, the local turn advocates for the stronger inclusion of the locals as well as their empowerment in peace and stability processes. With a closer look, it becomes clear that the local turn has emerged in two waves with significant differences in the past 25 years or so. The differing notions of the local turn also include somewhat dissimilar ideas of the local and why or how it should be included in crisis management and peace processes (Paffenholz,

2015). However, the two turns or waves can also be viewed as complementary (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015).

The first local turn emphasizes the meaningfulness of local contribution and ownership as increasing the effectiveness of crisis management and peacebuilding. The second sees the local level as a means of emancipation, focusing on local practices and principles over the universal principles commonly promoted in liberal peacebuilding (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Though the local turns can also be seen as one entity, and are often presented as such, the next sections look closer into both turns to build a clear image of what the concept of local turn can refer to.

2.2.1 The First Local Turn: Improving Efficiency

The first local turn emerged in the late 1990s, after the failure of the international interventions and support in places such as Rwanda, the Balkans, and Somalia. All of these provided unfortunate examples of letdowns of the international community and the liberal peace project. This first local turn was led by arguments emphasizing the necessity to empower locals in peacebuilding and crisis management missions, maintaining that it is ultimately the locals who can build sustainable peace (Lederach, 1997; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Thus, the motivation for, and focus of, this first local turn was in improving the efficiency of the peacebuilding and crisis management missions as well as the more sustainable results of these initiatives.

One of the first scholars to underscore the importance of the local level in peacebuilding was John Paul Lederach, who represents the conflict transformation school (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). The conflict transformation school builds on the assumption that the objective of peacebuilding should be sustainable reconciliation, which is reached by re-establishing relationships within societies, creating needed infrastructures and training people (Paffenholz, 2015). Lederach, and the conflict transformation school in general, argues for a cultural-sensitive model instead of the dominant, externally imported model of peacebuilding (Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg. 26–27), stresses the role of locals as resources rather than recipients (Lederach, 1997, pg. 93–97; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015) and presents a triangular model emphasizing bottom-up initiatives in conflict transformation (Lederach, 1997, pg. 38–45; Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg. 338).

Moreover, Lederach (1997) argues that the local culture should also be viewed as a source of knowledge and practice. He strongly emphasizes that the local actors and their culture are, in fact, the greatest resource for sustainable peace. Other scholars have described the first local turn as a communitarian approach, as it emphasizes the importance of context-specific solutions drawing input from the local actors and local culture, as well as the non-universality of peacebuilding endeavors (Donais, 2009).

In addition to the role of locals and local practices as resources, another significant aspect of the first local turn is its emphasis on the role of the middle-level actors in peace processes. These can include actors such as religious leaders, local community leaders and leaders of small NGOs, for instance. They are seen to have the best potential to create sustainable peace as they have connections and influence to both the top-level decision-makers as well as grass-roots level actors, but lack the vulnerability of the latter and the public pressure of the former, for example (Lederach, 1997, pg. 41–42, 60, 93–97). Thus, the middle-level leaders are considered the most important, because they are seen to bring the highest added-value compared to leaders on the other levels when assessing the efficiency of peace or stability building actions and interventions.

From the effectiveness perspective, therefore, things such as partnership, inclusion and ownership of local actors are seen to increase the legitimacy of crisis management missions in the eyes of the local population and increase the sustainability of the operations as well as the peaceful conditions they seek to promote. It has also been argued that a higher rate of inclusion of the local level actors increases the sustainability of the results of interventions, as well as their cost-effectiveness. Moreover, interacting and cooperating more with local actors was seen to enhance access, give the intervention more authenticity, and enable the foreign actors to exit faster and smoother (Mac Ginty, 2015).

The ideas of the first local turn also include that the international community should mainly have a supportive role in peacebuilding missions (Lederach, 1997, pg. 93–97). The international community with its liberal peacebuilding initiative is not considered as having bad intentions. Instead, it is seen as misguided and overestimating the capability of foreign interventions and the sustainability of the peace they attempt to build (Paffenholz, 2015). Therefore, I would argue that unlike the second local turn presented next, the first wave of the local turn is not as strongly against the liberal peace paradigm, though the need to alter it in significant ways is pointed out.

2.2.2 The Second Local Turn: Emancipation of the Local

The second local turn, or the second wave of the local turn, emerged in the 2000s. Like the previous local turn, the new wave was also closely inspired by the failures of the international community, this time in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whereas the first local turn also saw faults and the need for improvement in the liberal peace paradigm, the second local turn is a much more critical reaction to the conceptualization and enforcement of the liberal peace project (Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). While the first local turn has its background in the conflict transformation school and increasing the efficiency of interventions, the second local turn draws from critical peacebuilding theory and postcolonial frameworks (Paffenholz, 2015), as well as postmodern methodologies (Randazzo, 2016).

The liberal peace paradigm had proved to be the accepted norm in many interventions, though the international and regional organizations taking part in peacebuilding and crisis management had realized and admitted that many of the interventions based on the paradigm had not delivered the promised results. Therefore, the second wave of the local turn criticizes and aims to deconstruct the liberal peace paradigm, arguing that "*international peacebuilding discourse is trapped in the 'liberal imperative'*." (Paffenholz, 2015, pg. 861). The second local turn, focuses on the emancipation of local people and actors, reconnecting with the everyday and the real world, and giving space and agency to previously oppressed voices (Paffenholz, 2015; Randazzo, 2016).

The focus is set on local peacebuilding as a form of resistance against the liberal peace paradigm and the hegemony of international interventionist peacebuilding and crisis management initiatives it promotes. Therefore, the second local turn defines *"*the local" as an opposite to the international level. Further, local agency is understood as resistance to the liberal peace paradigm and its universalist practices and ideas (Paffenholz, 2015).

2.3 Hybrid Peace

The third approach to crisis management and peacebuilding included in this thesis combines parts of the previous approaches. Donais (2009), for example, argues that neither a mission focused on the liberal peace approach nor one focusing on principles of the local turns is

sufficient or suitable for building a strategy of sustainable peacebuilding and crisis management. Instead, he calls for combining these in a manner that activates actors and partnerships both horizontally and vertically. He refers to this as the hybrid peace approach.

Mac Ginty (2010), on the other hand, defines hybrid peace as being produced through interaction or interplay between actors, which results from distortions. These distortions are caused by clashes in paradigms between the actors as well as the actors and the environment (Mac Ginty, 2010). He further maintains that these distortions are an example of the fact that no actor has complete autonomy in a crisis management or peacebuilding context but must adapt to other actors and the wider context throughout the process. As a third example, Tardy uses the concept of hybrid peace *"to describe the kind of peace that is established in post-conflict settings as a result of the interplay between external and local actors."* (Tardy, 2014, pg. 95–96). Therefore, similarly to the previously introduced approaches, there are many ways to define hybrid peace, but the main idea is the same in all of them: combining aspects from liberal peace and local turn, as mentioned above.

A pursuit to combine the ideals of the liberal peace paradigm with the principles of local ownership provided by the two local turns is problematic, though it seems to commonly be the template used in many crisis management and peacebuilding operations (Donais, 2009). In practice, this often means that the main values and norms of liberal peace, such as democracy and liberal economic policies, are given by outside actors but implemented or partially implemented by local governance structures. It can be argued that in such cases the local ownership can be even disempowering rather than emancipating (Donais, 2009).

Richmond (2015) refers to this as negative hybrid peace. A positive hybrid peace would entail *"a contextually rooted process through which broader political and social injustice is addressed, across local and international scales."* (Richmond, 2015, pg. 51). Though to be in line with the terminology of this thesis, it would be more precise to refer to local and international levels. A positive form of hybrid peace includes a high level of agency, ownership and legitimacy emerging from local actors and the local level.

2.4 Challenges and Criticisms of the Local Turn and Hybrid Peace

As a brief recap of the above, the first local turn advocates increased local ownership as a means to increase the effectiveness of interventions. The second local turn, on the other hand, focuses on the local ownership as a primarily emancipatory aspect and views the liberal peace project in a very negative light. Hybrid peace, on the other hand, refers to approaches combining features from the liberal peace approach and the local turns. This section looks more closely into some of the criticism towards the local turn and hybrid peace, focusing on come of the challenges related to the concept of the local as well as local ownership and inclusion more generally.

Both turns, as well as the concept of hybrid peace, have created shifts in the practices and theoretical approaches of crisis management, while terms like "local agency" and "local ownership" have become increasingly common in academic peacebuilding literature as well as in the language used by international and regional actors. However, analyses have shown that more often than not the implementation of these concepts into practice has been quite limited and a top-down methodology still applies to most international interventions (Richmond, 2006; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015). Thus, it seems that the questions relating to the local level in peacebuilding and crisis management are by no means simple aspects to be implemented. And, though hardly any scholars would dismiss the idea or need to increase locals' ownership in crisis management and peacebuilding missions to enhance the sustainability of such processes (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014; Schierenbeck, 2015), neither of local turn nor the hybrid peace project stays un-criticized.

Scholars as well as practitioners have different views on many aspects relating to the local turn and hybrid peace, including conceptualizations of the local itself, which have inspired vivid criticism. For instance, some scholars have criticized involving locals at a stage, which they see as too late in the process, whereas others state that ownership and agency given in too large quantities at an early stage can harm the process (Kuehne et al., 2008). Therefore, the principles of the local involvement and local ownership, as well as the criticism towards them, need revision and research from many different perspectives. However, as this thesis focuses on the definitions and discourses of the local level and the connotations it is given, the criticism and challenges I present here are mostly those relating to these aspects. Moreover, these arguments also emphasize why it is important to have clear definition, as well as what kind of issues or challenges might be related to some local actors.

2.4.1 Binaries and Dichotomies

Commonly addressed issues in many papers discussing criticism towards the local turn are binaries or dichotomies related to the local. The more often pointed out binary is that on the one hand, the local level and its actors are treated as the saviors of crisis management and peacebuilding missions. On the other hand, the local is seen as the root source of the conflict, static, incapable, dysfunctional and "waiting to be civilized" (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017; Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2015, pg. 841). The latter perspective, or traces of it, might sound outdated, but it continues to influence the actions of many international organizations and states contributing to various interventions. In many cases, these views are sugarcoated with sensitive and inclusive language, though the attitudes and modes of thinking might not be so inclusive to the local views and actors (Mac Ginty, 2015). This sort of sugarcoating and imprecise use of participatory language and the false focus on the local often means that though the rhetoric of the local turn is strong, the practice of it is often rather weak or superficial (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015).

Another dichotomy, which downplays the usefulness of the local level as a concept, is the international and local as a mutually excluding binary (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017; Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). This criticism is especially tied to the second local turn, and some maintain that binary of local versus international as the most crucial problem within the discourse the latter local turn. By setting local and international as opposites, the local turn discourse sets a target on the back of the international, drawing abundant amounts of criticism to it. Many scholars also tend to define the "international" in a Eurocentric manner, focusing on the West, which can distort the discourse and lead to the dismissal of other potentially important actors such as China or Russia (Paffenholz, 2015). Instead of approaching the relation between international and local as a dichotomous binary, it should be viewed as a relationship between formal and informal (Randazzo, 2016).

2.4.2 Over-emphasizing the Local Level

Another set of challenges relates to over-emphasizing the local level or the local actors' capacities', for instance. A commonly cited criticism is that the local level, and the actors on it, are romanticized. This refers to actors assigning superficial characteristics to the local

level and local communities and actors. These can include narratives of the locals as "ecological warriors", "simple peasants" or "resistance force against global capitalism" (Mac Ginty, 2015, pg. 847), or inherently "good" or "more real" than the international (Paffenholz, 2015).

Though these descriptions or narratives are seemingly harmless and may mean well, they tend to be created at levels beyond the local and, thus, strip the local actors and communities of their agency to define their roles. They may also compress local identities into homogenous groups, though in reality these communities might be very heterogeneous and can include even contradictory identities and perspectives (Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Moreover, there might be no assurance that the local "owners" of a peace process have the resources, or even will, to build a peace and social order that is inclusive, sustainable and just (Donais, 2009). This might be especially problematic in cases in which local elites feel that they might lose some of their power and influence in the process, or due to its results.

Though aspects and values derived from a liberal peace paradigm can be harmful when forced upon a state through intervention (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, pg. 129–133; Ricigliano, 2012), some local practices may be equally harming. These could include practices and ways of thinking relating to gender or sexual violence, for example (Bleiker, 2012). Moreover, it is often viewed that crisis management and peacebuilding missions should in principle build on the existing local structures and traditions. However, in some cases these structures and traditions can have influenced the outbreak of the conflict (Kuehne et al., 2008), which can make them prone to inflict or support new conflicts and makes them potentially un-helpful in establishing sustainable peace.

Paffenholz (2015) also criticizes the exaggeration of resistance within the second local turn. The binary thinking of the local versus international is also relevant in this criticism, as the local is defined as resistance against the international. However, this disregards the potential resistance of the local elite against other local actors, for example. In practice this could mean voting against key issues in cases related to the implementation of peace accords to benefit elites which may profit from prolonging the conflict, for example. Another challenge related to concept of resistance is that in the local turn literature, it is rarely clearly defined what kind of actions count as resistance (Paffenholz, 2015). Therefore, it is hard to determine whether resistance is as common as the conceptual or theoretical literature might suggest.

Paffenholz (2015) also argues that the resistance of the local actors mainly targets leaders and powerful actors within the nation, not international actors, as the second local turn might suggest.

Romanticizing the local can also lead to a local-centric view. Similarly to the state-centrism common to the liberal peace paradigm, viewing the local level as the sole important level dismisses aspects that can only be understood by viewing the situation from another angle (Swyngedouw, 1997; Williams, 2011). Apart from criticizing emphasis on the local level in general, there are also arguments against over-emphasizing specific actors within the local level. For instance, the first local turn has also be critiqued for over-emphasizing of the middle-level or track II actors at the expense of the top-level and grass-roots actors that also play important roles and should, thus, not be excluded (Paffenholz, 2015).

Other approaches emphasizing the potential of partnering up with local NGOs to avoid challenges sometimes confronted when working with local elites have also been questioned. These challenges could include the elite's potential unmotivated participation in the building of an inclusive social order, for instance. The civil society is oftentimes seen as an actor, which does not present such challenges to the intervention. However, Donais (2009), for example, criticizes these views for overestimating the resources of the local NGOs as peacebuilders, for building rivalry between the NGOs and potentially increasing donor dependency. Donor dependency refers local actors becoming dependent on the resources, expertise and funding of the external actors, which is seen as a common dilemma related to cooperation between NGOs and external institutions. It is especially challenging since at the same time founding sustainable local structures often calls for long-lasting commitment from external partners, which can easily lead to donor dependency (Kuehne et al., 2008).

Together donor dependency and competition over funding mean that in practice many local NGOs act under the supervision, guidance and demands of international donors, thus undermining the ownership and agency of many local civil society actors. Moreover, though often presented as more inclusive or impartial, local NGOs and other civil society actors are heterogeneous subject to the same dynamics and motivations as the rest of the society (Donais, 2009). Therefore, the inclusion of civil society actors should not be viewed as unproblematic or automatically problem-solving, as is now often presented.

2.4.3 Vague Conceptualization

Some scholars also argue that "the local" is not necessarily a helpful construction because it is used in so many varying and sometimes even confusingly different ways. What the local level comprises of and who represents it has not been adequately addressed by the literature focusing on the local turn (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). The vague conceptualization leads to a situation where nearly anything and everything within a state can be labeled "local" and given the status of savior of crisis management missions, for instance. This enables giving access to those actors, which are most beneficial for the mission, but it does not necessarily increase the sustainability of the results nor emancipation of the locals. Thus, the question of who represents the local level should receive more careful thought as well as public reasoning and discussion. This is a key topic in the focus of this thesis.

It has also been argued that though local ownership has become an increasingly popular theme to research, the uses of the terminology still vary, and only little consistency can be found, which adds to the weakening of the concept, as was mentioned above (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). Thus, it seems that the local level is a very vague concept that can refer to anything from the state heads and other local elites to a farming community, or even a single person. This is also a potential challenge, as heterogenic and vague definitions limit the legitimacy of the local as a concept (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017).

What makes the definition so difficult is that there is no universal definition for which levels constitute a scale or what the scope of each scale is (see for example Sayre, 2005). Levels can be split into more levels by zooming in or out. Therefore, a state can be viewed as the lowest level on a scale including a region level and a global level, for instance. On the other hand, it is also a valid conceptualization to divide the state-level into lower levels such as those used by Lederach (1997). This would extend the scale into a six-level model of the global-, regional-, state-, middle-, and grass-roots levels. Due to this I question the purposefulness of such conceptions as universal ideas. What I find more interesting, is looking at what the "local level" is in a specific context, and what kind of ideas or definitions are attached to it. As these conceptions affect who and what is considered local, and thus who has access to local ownership, it becomes an important question to answer when assessing peacebuilding and crisis management from the viewpoint of the local turns.

Schierenbeck (2015) also argues that the conceptualization of the local level should be done case-specifically, and not universally. Furthermore, she states that commonly, scholars have opted to look at the local through one of three lenses: local as institutions, local as agency or local as process. In the first case, the local level actors, which are seen as the most relevant to include and empower to produce sustainable peace, are the local institutions. Therefore, creating or supporting local level governance, with preferably democratic means, is the key to a successful peacebuilding process.

In the second case, the focus is set grassroots level actors, political parties or civil society actors. In this approach, the interest lies in looking into these actors' agency and their capacity to overcome challenges on other levels within the national-local framework. Finally, in the third case, the local level is viewed as a non-static and ever-changing entity, which should not be viewed as a physical space or set of actors, but as a process (Schierenbeck, 2015). This third approach is especially common within the literature on the second local turn. Each of these definitions can be valid, but they are hardly comparable. Thus, a clear definition of which approach a research, or policy paper, takes is needed.

2.4.4 Conclusions

Despite these challenges or hindrances I argue that overlooking the local level is not the solution, as history has proven the poor success rate of top-down international interventions (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). I emphasize that it is essential to not put the local level on a pedestal, but to consider how it can work in close cooperation with the international level, for example, and in which ways the international should support the local level to achieve its best qualities and capabilities. And to be able to look for approaches that could bring more balance, which is a topic for further research, it is important to uncover what the local level is considered to consist of.

Summarizing the above, though the main idea of the local turn may be somewhat simple to catch; to include local actors in peacebuilding and crisis management more than before. However, though the local turns criticize the state-centrality of the liberal peace paradigm, these approaches too can lead to a problem of either over-emphasizing one level within the local scheme or are left with such vague definitions that they become rather un-useful or

even counterproductive, for example. Thus, I argue that a more comprehensive understanding of what the local level constitutes and what kind of definitions it is given in specific contexts is a useful and interesting practice. Questions that need to be answered are what, where or who is the local in the context one is looking at, and what kind of a role does it play and in what circumstances or issues?

The questions related to the local level need further focus and research if the role of the locals is to be increased significantly. Without careful research on the topic, it is easily left as a vague concept applied in ways most suitable to the other actors involved. Moreover, as local ownership has become an important value for many interventions, a central question relating to the local turn is who has the power and capability to define the local (Mac Ginty, 2015). This is because determining who or what constitutes as local also allows to effectively define, who has access to the processes related to these interventions. Or in other words, who's ownership of the mission is considered relevant.

Nevertheless, I argue that there is no universal answer to these questions. Instead of looking for one it is more fruitful to view it as a case-specific matter. More importantly, research alone cannot solve these issues, as they are a matter of practice. However, research can act as a basis for developments in the real world. The next chapter looks into ways to define the local from a human geographical perspective.

3 SCALE AND LEVEL

Whereas the previous chapter drew insights from primarily the fields of international relations and peace and conflict studies, this chapter is largely focused on geographical concepts and theories. The topic of this chapter is the theoretical approaches to scale and level, which are especially central in geographical research, though it is important to note that the concept is in wide use within other disciplines as well. This chapter aims to describe both the theoretical discussions as well as, how the concept is used as a part of the theoretical framework of this thesis.

Scale is a widely used but also vividly debated concept in human geography, and especially political geography, as well as some closely related fields of research, such as political ecology and social sciences (Agnew, 1994; Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Howitt, 1998; McMaster

& Sheppard, 2004; Sayre, 2005; Howitt, 2008; Herod, 2011). Its significance is hard to argue considering the vast use of the concept in different disciplines. However, the ways in which the concept is utilized and defined varies greatly.

In cartography and geographic information science, for example, scales are viewed as nested, hierarchical and fixed in size (McMaster & Sheppard, 2004). In social sciences scales are often used as a set of intuitively defined levels of analysis, such as global or national. These levels are treated similarly to those in cartography: fixed and unproblematic givens, through which organizations, actions and phenomena are being observed and studied (Delaney & Leitner, 1997). In human geography, on the other hand, arguing for and against different definitions of scale has been a hot topic since the 1980s, and scales are treated as anything but unproblematic in the literature focusing on the theoretical and analytical aspects of the concept.

The theoretical scale debate has problematized both the conventional geographical definitions as well as the intuitive definitions of scales from social sciences, adding a relational and socially constructed dimension to the concept, but has yet to reach a conclusion as to what scales are (Marston, Jones, & Woodward, 2005; Sayre, 2005; Howitt, 2008; Neumann, 2009; Termeer, Dewulf, & van Lieshout, 2010; Herod, 2011). Despite the focus and interest scale has received from various scholars especially since the 1980s, the concept is still used in a multitude of ways and there is no consensus even of whether the concept should be treated as an ontological or epistemological entity (see for example Howitt, 2008; Herod, 2011).

The literature and theories concerning scale and other concepts relating to it are important for this thesis in at least two ways. First, they give an analytical insight into what scales and levels are, and how they are socially constructed. Second, they argue that scales can affect processes, actors and phenomena. This point is elaborated with the concept of political opportunity structures. This section will present the main strands of the theoretical discussions relating to these concepts, as well as criticism they have received and the clarifications and further developments to the concepts and theories.

Though the main points of this section could be summarized more shortly, the geographical literature on scale and level is so diverse and conflicting that I find it important to address the concepts more broadly. However, to add clarity, the concluding section brings together the main takes of this chapter. It draws from both political-economic and poststructuralist

approaches, arguing that instead of determining whether scales are ontological or epistemological, or vertical or networked, in some cases it can be more fruitful to see scale as a concept possessing both epistemological and ontological, as well as vertical and networked aspects.

3.1 The Political-economic Approach & the Vertical Viewpoint of Scale

The political-economic approach was initially the prevailing perspective for many human geographers dealing with scales (Sayre, 2005). As was mentioned above, many disciplines often, though not always, treat scales as rigid, fixed and external to social processes, whereas human geographers incorporate relational and socially constructed ideas about scale to the definition (Jonas, 2011). In the political-economic approach to scales the central idea is that scales are seen as products of a wide range of social, economic, political and cultural processes (MacKinnon, 2011). In other words, they are socially constructed. For some, scales are also simultaneously the arenas for the aforementioned processes, and for all they are non-fixed structures, which vary over space and time (Swyngedouw, 1997; McMaster & Sheppard, 2004; Princen & Kerremans, 2008; MacKinnon, 2011).

Within the political-economic approach, the vertical viewpoint was the dominant point of view of scales at the beginning of the discussions of scales in human geography. It also continues to have strong support among scholars, though major criticism has also been raised, as will be pointed out later on in this chapter. Many scholars refer to this as the hierarchical viewpoint, but I have opted to mostly use the term vertical, since I wish to emphasize that the power relations between levels can be bottom-up, top-bottom or both directions, whereas hierarchy refers to power relations which are inherently top-bottom (Leitner & Miller, 2007).

One of the first introductions of scale in human geography was made by Peter Taylor at the beginning of the 1980s. Taylor's work built on Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory (or World System Analysis), and power relations between levels. He introduced a three-tier, or -level, model of scalar structuration, through which the world could be observed. The three levels were the urban, the nation and the global (P. J. Taylor, 1982). Another influential scholar especially in the early years was Neil Smith, who maintained the hierarchical model

presented by Taylor but emphasized slightly differing levels as the basis for his analysis: urban, regional, national and global (N. Smith, 1990; Howitt, 2008).

Later Smith also expanded the discussion around scales further with the concept of the politics of scale. The politics of scale has been used in slightly altering ways by different scholars, but the main idea is focused on viewing scales as social constructs, molded and remolded through socio-political contestation (Brenner, 2001; Häkli, 2018) and that "there is an unresolved (geo)politics involved." (Häkli, 2018). This forms the essence of the whole political-economic approach to scale. In practice, when viewing how a scale or the levels on it are constructed, one is looking at actions and definitions (Canagarajah & De Costa, 2016): participation, recognition (Howitt, 2008) as well as non-recognition (Swyngedouw, 1997), for example.

Initially, scholars such as Taylor and Smith maintained that scale and levels were produced by processes of capitalism. However, this capital-centered view was seen as inadequate my many (Herod, 2011: 16 - 17), and the theories of what produces or constructs scales widened considerably to include other economic, social and political processes and struggles at different levels (Delaney & Leitner, 1997; Marston, 2000; Herod, 2008; Brenner, 2016; Häkli, 2018).

Though the early research on scales and levels in human geography claimed to define scales as non-fixed (Häkli, 2018), it has been criticized for treating them as rather pre-determined and fixed once they were socially constructed (Howitt, 2008; Moore, 2008). In practice, this meant that scales and levels that were identified as once constructed were often used without having much further consideration of their relevance or contesting the traditional up-down power relations. Since those initial inputs of scales in human geography, however, a turn emphasizing a more fluid understanding of scale took place. Consequently, many scholars have further focused on and highlighted the flexibility and non-hierarchy of scales (Moore, 2008). For example, Swyngedouw (1997) shows how scales and levels are always fluid, contested and thus continuously reconstituted through socio-spatial relations. He further emphasizes that *"the continuous reshuffling and reorganization of spatial scales is an integral part of social strategies and struggles for control and empowerment."* (Swyngedouw, 1997: 140).

The political-economic perspective to scales and levels has been popular, but also drawn criticism from several scholars. The next section highlights key strands of this criticism,

which are not completely exhaustive representations of a whole array of criticism but do, however, bring forward the main dimensions of it. The criticism has influenced the previously dominant political-economic approach or vertical viewpoint to scales, which has subsequently been clarified and further developed, as is pointed out below.

3.2 Criticism and Further Clarifications

Until the late 1990's the vertical or hierarchical viewpoint of scales was not actively questioned in human geography. However, in the past 20 years or so, some scholars have found the vertical viewpoint of scales inadequate to catch the complexities of the socio-political ordering and, thus, added a horizontal aspect to the conception (Jonas, 2011; Häkli, 2018). The horizontal aspects form networks of relations, through which the different scales or levels are constructed. This is called the network viewpoint to scales. These networks are not organized in a spatially pre-ordered manner, but stretch across space and form "complex assemblages, topologies and entanglements of power." (Jonas, 2011, pg. 388). However, though some scholars wish to present these viewpoints as opposites, I find them most useful when thought of as complementary. A scale can have both vertical, even hierarchical, and networked, relational properties (Jonas, 2011; Häkli, 2018). Therefore, the network viewpoint can be treated as a criticism towards hierarchy, but also as an idea that can be added to complement the vertical dimension of the political-economic approach.

Perhaps the most stimulating and often cited criticism towards the political-economic approach to scales in human geography comes from poststructuralist scholars. For them, the key aspects of scale, and space more generally, is that it is inherently emergent, and constantly under reconstruction through social processes. They also argue that scales should only be treated as an epistemological framework, and not also an ontological one as in the political-economic approach. Within the poststructuralist discourse on the scale the most provocative and thought-provoking has been an article by Marston, Jones and Woodward published in 2005 (Jonas, 2006; Escobar, 2007; Leitner & Miller, 2007; Herod, 2008; Neumann, 2009; MacKinnon, 2011), in which the writers ultimately suggest that "scale" as a concept should be discarded completely from human geographical research and literature due to the insurmountable issues they claim to accompany it (Marston et al., 2005). More

specifically they point to problems or issues they have found with the conceptualization and use of scales in the political-economic tradition.

3.2.1 Hierarchy or Verticality

As the focal point of their criticism, Marston et al. (2005) address the organization of scales, which they claim is inherently hierarchical and pre-sorted. They further maintain that even though researchers frequently refer to the social construction of scales, it seems that often only a small number of pre-determined and hierarchically structured scales are utilized in the analysis, such as those named by Taylor (1982) or Smith (1990). In other words, they maintain that the political-economic literature often seems to reify scales, treating them as fixed, while insisting that they are non-fixed and fluid, as was briefly brought up before. One key issue with these scales and levels is that if they are pre-assumed, it is very easy to slip into thinking how social relations, actions and organizations fit those scales. Thus, it can turn to a case where the form determines the content (Marston et al., 2005; Moore, 2008).

Though assumed hierarchy of scales has also drawn-in criticism from other scholars (see for example Escobar, 2007; Moore, 2008), many strongly disagree with this view. Leitner and Miller (2007), for example, point out that many poststructuralists seem to have merged the concepts of "vertical" and "hierarchical". The difference between these two is that a hierarchical structure entails top-down power relations, whereas a vertical does not in itself imply whether the relations are top-down, bottom-up, or both by default, as was mentioned earlier. Therefore, the image of overpowering domination of the "upper" levels would seem to be based on a misinterpretation of scale literature, since much of it is, in fact, based on a verticality, not necessarily hierarchy (Leitner & Miller, 2007). This is a distinction I also emphasize in the terminology of this thesis.

Moreover, MacKinnon (2011) has argued that the criticism of pre-sorted and reified scales and levels is based mostly on cases, in which scale has preceded social activities, as it has been structured by previous social activities. This way, a scale and its levels can also reach a temporarily fixed status. Following these, I would then argue that a scale and its levels can still be fluid and contested through the social activities, though they would not be necessarily newly emerging. In addition, as Moore (2008) and Brenner (2016) maintain, a vertical view

of scales has great value in addressing power relations, and that this does not require the abandonment of critical thinking and openness towards alternating and fluid levels.

3.2.2 Vague Definitions and Strong Binaries

Marston et al. (2005) also state that there is a wide-reaching confusion with the various definitions of scale. More precisely, they find that many scholars fail to distinguish between *scale* as size, meaning scope or extensiveness, and scale as level, which they define as a nested hierarchy (Marston et al., 2005). Other scholars, such as Adam Moore and Neil Brenner, also perceive scale as confusing, due to the multitude of definitions and impreciseness sometimes related to the use of the concept. For Moore (2008), the problem arises with the lack of distinction between scale as a category of analysis and a category of practice, whereas Brenner highlights the analytical blunting of the concept due to its overuse (Brenner, 2001; Herod, 2008).

Many other scholars also argue for a need to have clearer definitions of what scales or levels are and what is meant with them in an analysis. However, instead of disposing of scales and levels from human geography as Marston et al. (2005) suggest, they seek to overcome this problem by creating clearer definitions and distinctions among different dimensions of both scale and level (see for example McMaster & Sheppard, 2004; Sayre, 2005). As I agree that this is a more fruitful way to move forward rather than disregarding the concept, I have made an effort to carefully define the concepts of scale and level previously in this chapter.

Another issue Marston et al. (2005) raise is the seeming impossibility to separate levels from binaries, such as global versus local. Such binaries tend to be laden with attached characteristics that affect how we see the phenomenon. For example, the global level is often seen as more powerful or produced, whereas the local level is commonly automatically seen as weak or authentic (Gibson-Grayham, 2002; Marston et al., 2005; Moore, 2008). Marston et al. (2005) assert that this results in a scenario, in which the global is assigned causal force or power, and the local is left without agency.

Other scholars have also presented similar concerns. For instance, Gibson-Grayham, has examined the global versus local binaries and brought up similar concerns of an over-powering global discourse (Gibson-Grayham, 2002). Howitt, on the other hand, has further emphasized that one should be careful not to conflate a spectrum into a binary, as it would

obscure other, possibly even more important, dimensions (Howitt, 2008). However, these claims have also been opposed by other scholars who point out that poststructuralist scholars have dismissed a vast amount of scale literature addressing this issue, assigning clear agency to local levels in many cases (Leitner & Miller, 2007; MacKinnon, 2011). Poststructuralists appear to also overlook the possibilities various levels provide for different spatial strategies, which are not all controlled by the global (Jonas, 2006). Thus, it seems that asserting a global versus local binary over a phenomenon can indeed distort an analysis, but it is not unavoidable if taken into conscious consideration throughout the process.

3.2.3 Political Opportunity Structures

The above-mentioned point by Marston et al. (2005) is closely related to ideas of discourse theory, which highlights how the societal discourses around different levels also affect the way they are perceived and treated, as will be demonstrated further on. Thus, discourses can make some scales more important than others or give the levels attributes, which affect how they are dealt with, as human behavior reflects the narrative created by the discourses (McMaster & Sheppard, 2004). For example, Herod (2008) maintains that though metaphors are always idealistic simplifications of the real world, they still matter because the way we see, for example scales or levels, affects the decisions we make in our pursuits.

Viewing a scale as a ladder or another type of strict hierarchy affects how we view power hierarchies and the "way-up" through one level at a time. However, it should be kept in mind that these metaphoric views of scale should not be taken for granted. Each scale can have a different structure, and the same scale can be viewed very differently by different actors. Likewise, levels such as the local can be perceived differently by different actors. This thesis is interested in uncovering how the EU conceives the local level in the context of civilian crisis management.

As an example, Swyngedouw (1997) explains how choosing a level of analysis can be used as a spatial strategy, as it can underline certain aspects while leaving other aspects or causes to the sidelines. He maintains, that *"different scalar narratives indicate different causal moments and highlight different power geometries explaining such events. Scale is, consequently, not socially or politically neutral, but embodies and expresses power relationships."* (Swyngedouw, 1997, pg. 140). Thus, even if scales are seen as epistemological lenses through which the world is viewed, analyzed or perceived, they can have material

effects. In some ways this makes seemingly never-ending debate about the ontological-epistemological status of scales somewhat irrelevant (MacKinnon, 2011) at least for this thesis. What I am at interested in is how the local is conceptualized and how these conceptualizations provide opportunities and obstacles for local ownership and participation.

These notions on perception's effects on social reality are closely connected to the idea of *political opportunity structures*, or opportunity structures for short. Broadly speaking, the concept refers to those characteristics of an institution or other contexts, which determine the requirements or abilities for outside actors or other interest groups to have an impact in decision-making (Berclaz & Giugni, 2005; Princen & Kerremans, 2008). However, opportunity structure is a concept which has been used in a multitude of ways.

Princen and Kerremans (2008) have identified four strands of literature, which use the concept of opportunity structures in slightly varying but also complementary ways. In the literature relating to political contention the focus of the conceptualization of the opportunity structures is on the grade of structural openness of the institution and its receptivity to claims made by outside actors. In the exchange perspective, the focus is set on access, which depends on mutual dependency or benefit. In other words, through this perspective, outside actors can gain access to the decision-making of an institution if both the institution and the actor have something to give to each other. In practice, outside actors can be seen to offer some needed resources, information or legitimacy, for example. These "offerings" are called "critical access goods". The third conceptualization of political opportunity structures lies in the literature about venue shopping, which highlights how actors can move between institutions or levels to gain access to decision-making, or where the actors' other objectives are best met. These movements may require modifying or constructing the actor's image so that it is in line with the institutions focuses and preoccupations (Princen & Kerremans, 2008).

The venue shopping perspective is closely related to a key concept in the geographical scale literature: jumping scales, which points at actions or strategies organizations or actors use to expand their influence beyond the space it resides in. This can be achieved, for example, through up- or down-scaling policy challenges or problems by framing them as, for instance, local or national. By jumping scales, or levels to be more in line with the terminology used in this thesis, actors can attempt to claim or reject responsibility for a process, or to gain access to decision-making processes or obtain resources related to the issue at hand (N.

Smith, 1990; Marston et al., 2005; Herod, 2008; Princen & Kerremans, 2008; Termeer et al., 2010).

Berclaz and Giugni (2005) also make interesting notions about political opportunity structures. They maintain that opportunity structures should be researched as an issue- or case-specific issues because different groups can have very different experiences with attempting to access the same institution. The variability can result from the image or identity of the outside actor or their objectives, for example. If the institution sees the objective or cause of the interest group as something, which threatens the institution's core values, the opportunity structures can seem rather closed, which is closely linked to Princen and Kerremans' (2008) notion of venue shopping.

All of the three notions of opportunity structures mentioned above lie mainly on an exogenous perspective, in which the structures are seen as fixed constraints and external to the actions of the interest groups (Princen & Kerremans, 2008). By contrast, the fourth conceptualization named by Princen and Kerremans (2008) lies on an endogenous approach, in which both the institutions and the outside actors influence the political opportunity structures. This approach is found within the human geographical notion of the construction of scale, which was the topic of the previous chapter. This notion of the social construction of scale is relevant to political opportunity structures because it accentuates the processes through which actors can seek to construct scales and levels, and thus affect the opportunity structures present at each level. The attention is set on how a certain level or issue is framed.

Instead of putting the mainly endogenous and exogenous perspectives as opposites, Princen and Kerremans (2008) maintain that these notions of the political opportunity structures should be used as complementary, which is also the viewpoint taken in this thesis. My main interest here is to focus on how the local level is socially constructed by the language used in the EU's documents, thus taking point on the human geographical approach to opportunity structures, but I will attempt to address the other three approaches as well. This is done by examining whether the discourse constructing the local level indicates potential critical access goods wanted from the interest groups at different levels of the EU's structures, or whether some image requirements are preferred, for example, which refer to the exchange perspective and venue shopping mentioned above.

3.2.4 Scale as Relation

As mentioned above, Marston et al. (2005) conclude in their criticism that scale and levels should be discarded as analytical concepts. Instead, they offer a "flat ontology", a relational entity comprised of networks. While this could eliminate some of the issues related to a hierarchical view of scalar structures, it is not an easy, or necessarily even quality-improving, solution to the "scale-question" (Jonas, 2006; Leitner & Miller, 2007). Jonas (2011), for example, emphasizes that the notion of a flat ontology makes the already complex concept possibly even more confusing and dismisses the usefulness and positive attributes related to analysis utilizing scales and levels.

Therefore, instead of focusing on a flat ontology, I opt for emphasizing the relations *between* levels, not only levels themselves. This view is highlighted by Howitt (1998), for example, who underlines the importance of viewing scale as relations. He explains this through a descriptive metaphor: musical scales. In this metaphor, a scale is viewed as a set of relations between levels. In addition, and maybe more importantly, Howitt's recognition of scale as relation points us to look at how phenomena present at different scales. Musical notes themselves do not change. However, they can sound or present themselves rather differently, depending on the musical scale they are played as a part of, as its relation to the surrounding musical notes is changed. Similarly, what is relevant or significant about a phenomenon or a level may change depending on the scalar configuration in which it is placed. Each presentation of a phenomenon or actor at a different scale or level is equally real. In complex contexts it is, thus, important to study the relations between levels to uncover the scale formation and also understand how the levels relate to one-another (Howitt, 1998).

I also argue that seeing the scale as inherently relational. Thus, also looking at other levels beyond the local, enables one to steer away from a point-of-view, which is focused on a single level, be it state-centrism or local-centrism. This way, though the focus of the thesis is on the local level, it also gains some positive aspects more commonly related to a multi-level approach. In many cases, a multi-level approach is the only way an integrated and unified understanding of a phenomenon can be achieved. This has been acknowledged by many scale-scholars, and increasingly also by scholars of international relations (Sayre, 2005; Koops & Biermann, 2016).

In practice, a multi-level approach or framework requires defining suitable levels on a scale for analysis, and thus, having different points of view to a research question. In many cases each level gives a different reasoning or perspective (Swyngedouw, 1997; Williams, 2011). However, the reality, though perhaps never completely reachable through studies, is often more than the sum of the individual reasoning. Therefore, what is key in many cases including this thesis, is to also analyze the connections between individual levels.

Scholars in international relations have identified a twofold problem relating to levels of analysis. First, how does one identify the correct or relevant levels for analysis, and second, how to divide the explanatory weight between those levels (Buzan, 1995; Williams, 2011). These are relevant dilemmas, which need to be taken into consideration in the analysis. However, instead of attempting to find a one-size-fits-all solution to these questions, one can take Howitt's (2008) viewpoint in which stating that a scalar framework should be drawn case-specifically from the evidence.

As can be noted from the discussions cited above relating to both the poststructuralist approach as well as the comprehensive view of spatiality, scale, and levels as concepts used in research continue to be highly debated. Concepts such as "flat ontology" and multiple spatialities have received much attention and have, to some extent, taken up space formerly (over)occupied by scale literature. This is certainly a much-needed discussion, as it has brought up insights from the scale debate, which were formerly left untouched or taken for granted. Häkli (2018) argues that these new concepts may over-run the significance of scales in human geography at some point. However, in the meantime, there is no need to discard the concept of scale and levels completely, as the concept still seems to shine light into many processes and phenomena in the geopolitical world.

3.3 Further Definition of Scale and Levels in This Thesis

So far, I have established that scale and level are contested, complicated but often used concepts in human geography, and that their conceptualizations can have both ontological and epistemological consequences. As was pointed out numerous times, the diversity of definitions given to scale and level vary greatly. Thus, it is of great importance to clearly define how scales and levels are viewed in an analysis, which I already started by separating the two terms in the Key Concepts -section. By defining a clear framework, I will highlight,

which aspects are emphasized, and perhaps which aspects will be overlooked or toned down. In this thesis, there are five main points I want to emphasize from the geographical scale literature.

First, even though levels such as local, national or global may seem "natural" or "organic", they are socially constructed and continuously contested though various social, political, economic and cultural processes, and they reflect social relations and power (Swyngedouw, 1997; Towers, 2000). The social and political construction comes about through actions; organizing a response, participation, recognition (Howitt, 2008), non-recognition (Swyngedouw, 1997) and definitions (Canagarajah & De Costa, 2016), for example. Individuals, groups and institutions can all hold agency in this process.

Second, scalar conceptualizations, constructions of levels and metaphors should not be thought of as accurate images of how the world is organized. Instead, they are crude simplifications and ways to make sense of a phenomenon (Herod, 2008; Paasi, 2008). This, however, does not mean that levels could not have material effects, meaning that they can have both ontological and epistemological dimensions. The conceptualizations and metaphors used affect how actors and organizations identify levels, strive to meet their goals, what kind of obstacles and opportunities are seen or present at each level of a scale, as well as how these levels link to decision-making. Thus, the way a scale is constructed manifests in differing opportunities and obstacles at different levels on the scale.

Third, following Howitt (1998), levels should be looked at as a part of the larger scalar construction, as the relations between levels also affect the configuration of each level. This also at least partially prevents putting too much emphasis on one level, as the levels are understood as inherently relational. This also includes some aspects of a multi-level understanding, if not as fully as a multi-level research would.

Fourth, a scale can be vertical, networked, or both. Verticality does not necessarily mean absolute hierarchy; connections and power can move up-bottom, but also bottom-up depending on the case in point. Finally, fifth, as scales and levels are socially constructed and fluid, one should not solely rely on levels of a scale that have previously seen as the most important in geographical studies, such as those named by Taylor (1982). Instead, there is a need to analyze and understand that there may be other scales, which are more important in a certain case or for a certain phenomenon (McMaster & Sheppard, 2004). Thus, in this thesis I take the local level as my starting point, but I do not give it a predetermined definition. Instead, I

will seek to understand what the different definitions given to it may be in this context. Moreover, despite the fluidity, the scalar configurations can be temporarily fixed, and can pre-exist a social process as a result of the previous process (MacKinnon, 2011). Fixity should also be seen as a demonstration of the processes producing the structure. These points refer to both the levels of the EU's decision-making as well as the local scale they are constructing.

This third chapter concludes the introduction of the theoretical concepts and frameworks used in the thesis. First, I outlined why the local level is seen as important in the context of crisis management and peacebuilding by overviewing literature related to the local turns. This chapter also argued that though the local level is seen as vital to the success and sustainability of stability and peace, most foreign interventions still rely on concepts related to the liberal peace paradigm. I further argue that for the local level to gain a stronger ownership, we must become more aware of what is meant with "the local". To look at these definitions, I draw theoretical input from human geography, and political geography to be more precise. Therefore, I look at the local as a level, which is socially constructed and fluid. It is a part of a wider scale, and the conceptualization of the local level and its relation to the other levels define the potential political opportunity structures on it.

4 THE EU AND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The previous chapters have focused on the theoretical framework of this thesis, which comprises of the three approaches to crisis management, view of scale and levels as social constructs as well as the notion of political opportunity structures. Before turning to the methods and the analysis, this chapter presents the case of my interest in this thesis by introducing the EU's CSDP, focusing on civilian crisis management as well as the key structures of EU's civilian crisis management. These form the context of the analysis of the local level.

In brief, crisis management refers to actions taken by international or national actors to prevent or interrupt a violent conflict, or to support creating sustainable peace and security in a post-conflict situation, like was established in the Key Concepts. Crisis management missions can have civilian or military components, or they can be a combination of both. As the focus of the analysis of the thesis is on the EU, I find it important to clarify the concepts

relevant specifically in the EU context. In addition to these clarifications, this section includes a short description of the EU's structures related to its civilian crisis management missions.

4.1 Civilian Crisis Management

As was mentioned before, concepts such as crisis management, peacebuilding, peacekeeping are sometimes used as synonyms, though they have distinct, although sometimes slightly overlapping, definitions. They are used in varying ways by different organizations, which can lead to slight misinterpretations. Most people tend to connect these concepts with actions taken by armed forces. However, the focus of this thesis revolves around civilian crisis management. *Civilian crisis management* is a term used primarily by the EU, to which we will turn to shortly. Though other actors, such as the UN and the OSCE, engage in corresponding or similar activities, none of them use civilian crisis management as a distinct concept (Suhonen, 2016). The Nato has also signaled that it aims to develop further develop its civilian capabilities as a part of its comprehensive approach, but so far it has mostly focused on cooperating with other organizations' civilian components (Nato, 2018).

Civilians working in the field of crisis management have been around as a concept for almost as long as peacekeeping missions, as some of the UN's first peacekeeping mission included civilian monitors. Civilian crisis management is an approach in which societies and states are supported through civilian means to create peace, stability and security. Like the other types of operations, civilian crisis management missions, or civilian segments of wider operations, are always build case-specifically and often include more than one sector of civilian crisis management actors. The local actors supported, trained or substituted are mainly authorities (Ulkoministeriö, 2019).

Civilian crisis management is a part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) along with military crisis management missions, and CSDP is one of the integral components of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Council of the European Union, 2018a). Though mechanisms of the CSDP were initially primarily justified as means to address the so-called Petersburg Tasks, which are military in their nature, most CSDP missions up until today have been civilian ones (M. E. Smith, 2017, pg. 128).

The European Community (later the EU) became involved in civilian crisis management at the beginning of the 1990s, when it sent civilians to monitor during the Yugoslav Wars, though it was not called civilian crisis management at the time. Since then, the concept has been formed and reformed and now includes a variety of civilian experts besides monitors. The end of the Cold War, and the conflicts in the Balkans that followed it, incited the EU to launch mechanisms and tools with which it could respond to conflicts and crises. Therefore, in 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the European Security and Defence Policy, which has since been reframed as the CSDP. After that, civilian capabilities have been further developed through so-called Civilian Headline Goals as well as the Treaty of Lisbon, for instance (EEAS, 2016b).

On a strategic level, the reasonings for civilian crisis management include responding to external conflicts and crises, strengthening the capacities of partners, such as local authorities and political elites, and protecting the EU as well as its citizens. These strategic goals are also seen as mutually reinforcing (EEAS, 2017d). Therefore, though the primary effects of the civilian crisis management missions might be on the host country, which refers to the country in which the CSDP mission takes place and which it aims to stabilize or support, the motives for the EU's strong role in intervening crises and conflict lie also in protecting the EU and its citizens. The argument is that internal and external security are intertwined and interlinked, and thus creating peace and stability beyond the EU's borders affects the EU's security in a positive manner as well (see for example Pirozzi, 2013; EEAS, 2016c; EEAS, 2017d). Thus, I maintain that CSDP is highly political and aimed at promoting the EU's benefits, not only promoting peace in the world from an ideological perspective.

The EU's priorities for civilian crisis management were set in a meeting in Santa Maria da Feira, Portugal, by the European Council in June 2000. These are often referred to as the Feira priorities. The document states four key priority areas that the EU's civilian CSDP missions should focus on: police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening the civilian administration and civil protection (European Council, 2000). More recently, the Feira priorities have been updated. In effect, out of the original four priorities, civil protection has been left out, since it is covered by other instruments than CSDP. In its place the EU has added five new priority areas: monitoring capacities; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), and support to the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) (EEAS, 2017d).

Moreover, the areas of interest that a civilian mission could attempt to address and support local counterparts have also been updated in the Civilian CSDP Compact published in 2018. They now include, for instance, improving border management and preventing irregular migration, enhancing maritime security, addressing hybrid threats and cybersecurity, countering terrorism and radicalization as well as countering organized crime (Council of the European Union, 2018b). Thus, in practice, civilian CSDP mission can be deployed to monitor, support, advice and provide training for local officials, or even act as interim authorities in some cases to address a large variety of issues (EEAS, 2017d; Council of the European Union, 2018a). Recently, the trend has been to shift the EU's focus more and more towards training missions (Iklody, 2017). These tasks and possibilities of Civilian CSDP missions are commonly seen as useful instruments for conflict prevention or in a post-conflict situation, not necessarily during a conflict.

In addition to experts relating to the themes and areas of interest above, civilian crisis management missions include personnel taking care of supportive tasks, such as HR, security and communications, political advisors as well as experts on human rights and gender, project coordinators and so forth (EEAS, 2017d; Council of the European Union, 2018a). At the end of 2019, there were a total of 2010 experts working in the ten civilian CSDP missions and Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutors Office, which is set up in The Hague. The majority of the experts working in the missions are internationals, who are either seconded by their national authorities or so-called contracted internationals, meaning that they are hired directly by the mission (CPCC, 2020).

At the end of last year, the percentage of seconded staff in the EU's civilian crisis management missions was around 37 % (CPCC, 2020). However, the EU's aim is that the share of seconded experts would be raised to around 70 % of the international staff and to prioritize hiring seconded staff to operational positions (Council of the European Union, 2018b; The European Commission, 2019). Based on the current proportion between contracted locals and contracted internationals (CPCC, 2020), this will likely also lower the number of local staff hires even further in the future if the Member States (MSs) follow with the EU's ambitions. I think this raises questions about the EU's commitment or approach to local ownership, as international presence seems to be more valued in a civilian CSDP mission.

Some scholars argue that the path for local ownership to become such a "buzzword" in the policy papers and rhetoric of the EU was smoothened due to the need of major EU countries'

attempts to overcome their colonial burden (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). Some maintain, that the EU uses it as a rhetoric to boost legitimacy (Ejdus, 2017; Ejdus, 2018) and the EU portrays it as enabling more efficient missions (EEAS, 2016c). Whichever the main reasoning for it is, what is certain is that the EU has promoted local ownership as a key element of CSDP for years in its publications and documents (see for example Rayroux & Wilén, 2014; European Commission, 2015; Ejdus, 2017). Therefore, as it is seen to have such a pivotal role in civilian CSDP missions, it is also very important to define, who, what or where the local is.

4.2 The Process for Establishing a Civilian CSDP Mission

The EU launched its first official civilian crisis management mission, the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003 (M. E. Smith, 2017, pg. 1–2). After that a total of 22 civilian crisis management missions, or civilian CSDP Missions to use more precise EU-terminology, have been launched by the EU (Council of the European Union, 2018a). Currently, the EU has 11 ongoing civilian CSDP missions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EEAS, 2019d).

Deploying a civilian CSDP mission involves numerous bodies (Figure 1) and a networked decision-making process (Xavier & Rehl, 2017, pg. 78–82). The political decisions about civilian crisis management take place in the Foreign Affairs Council (Council or FAC). The FAC comprises of ministers of Member States. Decisions related to the CFSP are mostly based on a consensus principle (Amorim, 2017), which means that the influence of the Member States (MSs) is significant. The consensus principle allows for even an individual MS to have leverage in a negotiation for new missions or their mandates, as they can block these decisions. This can lead to bargaining and on its own create obstacles for coherent local ownership across missions, because some MSs may have interests they want to protect by not handing over as much influence on local institutions.

The FAC is supported by working groups, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Suhonen, 2016, pg. 23–24). The PSC has two main roles in the field CSDP. First, it monitors issues and situations related to the CFSP of the EU, takes part in defining policies and gives advice within the FAC, directing the CIVCOM (introduced below). Second, it maintains the political control and

strategic direction of civilian CSDP missions. The PSC has decision-making power in this field in cases when it is empowered by the Council (Amorim, 2017, pg. 52–53). The PSC is comprised of ambassadors from member states. In the event of a crisis or conflict, or the risk of one, the PSC considers whether CSDP actions may be applicable in the particular case (Xavier & Rehl, 2017, pg. 79).



Figure 1. The main structures related to the establishment of the EU's CSDP missions. (based on Figure 2 in Bátora et al., 2016, pg. 13)

The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) is composed of representatives of EU member states. It supports and gives advice and recommendations to the PSC on potential threats, risks and crises along with its military counterpart, the EU Military Committee (EUMC). More importantly, the CIVCOM prepares planning documentation for new civilian missions and develops strategies for civilian crisis management as well as civilian capabilities (Amorim, 2017).

The European External Action Services (EEAS) is the EU's diplomatic service working under the leadership of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-president of the European Commission (HR/VP). It was established as a result of the Lisbon Treaty in 2011. In addition to its other functions, it also includes a department responsible for CSDP and crisis response. When a crisis erupts, the EEAS drafts a

Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) document, which includes an array of options the EU can take with regards to the crisis. The decision of which options will be implemented, if any at all, is made on a political level by the member states (Xavier & Rehl, 2017, pg. 79–80).

If the PSC decides that a CSDP action is seen as an option, a Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is drafted by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). The CMC includes an analysis of the situation and the document forms the conceptual framework of the mission by ensuring an integrated approach. It states the EU's political interests as well as the strategic options available and the goal of the mission or other activities. The CMPD is primarily responsible for the political-strategic planning of the CSDP, as well as conducting reviews on existing missions. In the case of a civilian crisis management missions, the CMPD is supported by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The CPCC serves as the operational headquarters for all civilian CSDP missions (Xavier & Rehl, 2017, pg. 79–80). The Director of CPCC is the Civilian Operations Commander, and holds the command of the strategic level of operational planning and implementation of civilian crisis management missions, and supports the Head of Mission (HoM) on fulfilling their mandates, for example (EEAS, 2019a). Both the CMPD and CPCC operate within the EEAS.

After completion, the CMC is submitted to the PSC, which reviews it together with CIVCOM. If the CMC is accepted by the PSC, it is further submitted to the Council for approval. Next, if the CMC is fully approved, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and the Operational Plan (OPLAN) are put together by the Civilian Operations Commander and his team in the CPCC. The CONOPS and OPLAN are presented to the PSC, which further submits them to the FAC, if necessary. If all plans are approved by the PSC/the Council, the CSDP mission can begin to be implemented. The PSC holds the political control and strategic direction of the missions, but it is under the authority of the FAC. In the field, the main responsibility of the implementation of a mission's mandate is in the hands of a Head of Mission (HoM), who reports to the CPCC's Commander. The Civilian Operations Commander further reports back to the PSC (Xavier & Rehl, 2017).

In addition to the above-mentioned EU bodies, which are specifically focused or involved in CSDP missions, some civilian CSDP missions also interact closely with EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) as well as EU Delegations (EUD). The EUSRs are appointed to promote the EU's core policies and watch over the EU's interests in post-conflict or otherwise

potentially unstable areas. Currently, there are seven EUSRs with a regional or thematic focus area. They cover Bosnia and Herzegovina, Horn of Africa, Kosovo, Sahel and South Caucasus, as well as the crisis in Georgia Central Asia, Human Rights and Middle East Peace Process (EEAS, 2019b). The EUDs have a wider role, representing and defending the EU's values and interests, and there are around 150 of them all over the world (Glume, 2015). In some cases, such as Kosovo, these two bodies function together so that the Head of the EUD is also a EUSR in the area (EEAS, 2016a). Both the EUSRs as well as the Heads of EU Delegations can, for example, be a source for local political guidance for the HoMs (Glume, 2015).

As the above shows, the number of bodies involved in the processes of planning, deciding upon and implementing a civilian CSDP mission is quite large and the process is not a straightforward one. It is also not clear from the description of the process in which stages local actors or influence is involved. Literature on local ownership is not unanimous as to the stage from which local incorporation should be a part of the process for the local ownership to take place (Rayroux & Wilén, 2014). Therefore, as the next section introducing the materials of this thesis shows, I have tried to incorporate materials from many different actors and stages in the process, as far as was possible taking into consideration the fact that many documents relating to a civilian CSDP mission are not public.

5 MATERIALS AND METHODS

The previous chapters have introduced the main concepts and theories relevant to this thesis as well as the context of the EU's civilian crisis management. The thesis draws from the notion of the local turn in peace and conflict studies, which highlights the importance of local involvement and ownership in peacebuilding and crisis management. I seek to examine the concept of "local" in the EU's civilian crisis management by addressing it with an approach from human geography, focusing on the local level as a social construct, and what kind of political opportunity structures could arise from this structuration. In this chapter I will introduce the materials and method used in the analysis.

The analysis of this thesis is based on qualitative research, for which the data was collected from various documents. The thesis uses discourse analysis as its research method to uncover narratives and meanings attached to the local level, as well as how the local level relates to

other levels. Through discourse analysis I also seek to discuss the possible political opportunity structures these discourses, definitions and narratives create. Before going deeper into the method, I first present the materials.

5.1 Materials

The materials for this thesis consist of EU documents obtained online. All documents deal with civilian crisis management, CSDP or the EU's external action more generally. They have all been made public and are, thus, available for others to assess as well. There are countless documents that could have been included in the materials of this thesis. The themes are dealt with by various actors within the EU, which means that the number of produced documents is also large. However, to stay within reasonable bounds, the number of primary sources had to be limited.

Phillips and Hardy (2002) have listed useful questions to refer to when choosing material for discourse analysis:

- Which texts or other materials are the most relevant in constructing the object of analysis, meaning the local level in this case?
- Which potential materials are produced by the most influential institutions or actors, communicated through the most efficient means, and interpreted by the largest group of actors?
- Which of these texts or other materials are attainable?
- Which of these are reasonable to analyze within the current framework? (Phillips & Hardy, 2002 pg. 75)

As there is no clear set or category of documents, which would be best suited for answering my research questions, I resorted to browsing through large quantities of potential materials and assessed them with the help of the above questions. I ran numerous searches in various EU document databases searching with keywords, such as "CSDP", "local ownership", "civilian crisis management", and "CFSP". The searches provided hundreds if not thousands of hits, out of which the vast majority were not useful for the analysis of this thesis. Their topic was completely off, or they focused only or mainly on cooperation between various EU bodies, not EU and the host country.

I decided to focus on official EU documents produced within the past five years to avoid outdated strategies and information. Therefore, I sorted out documents filling the following criteria: published by EU institutions 2015–2020, deals with CSDP missions and/or EU external action in general and refers to the themes of local actors or local ownership in at least some part of the document. I left out some documents, which only had one vague reference to the host country or local ownership, as I did not see how they would bring anything new to the analysis. However, it should be noted that I did not discard all of these documents, as they can also build discourses through absences or by constructing other relevant levels. After finding potential documents, I browsed through them to search for those that were either very significant in the field of CSDP missions or EU external action, or those, which were not perhaps as significant but had more noteworthy segments on the local level. Thus, especially the first question, relating to the importance or status of the document, was something I valued to a high level when choosing the documents.

To gain a more comprehensive view, I wanted to include a variety of different kinds of documents. It could be criticized that a more delimited set of materials would provide a more focused approach to a research theme. However, I argue that this specific research topic benefits from the larger variety, as the theme of the local level is not dealt with specifically in any single one category of materials nor a single EU body, as was established in the previous section. Instead, the discourse of the local level is spread in different sized bits and pieces across these documents. Moreover, these documents and the institutions behind them are often interlinked, which further supports the idea of choosing the materials to include many categories of documents.

It should be noted that the attainability question had a significant impact on the materials since many potentially very interesting documents are not available for the public. These include the documents formulating the potential or actual establishment of a new mission, such as the Crisis Management Concept and Operational Plan, for example. In practice, this limited my research to strategic level documents only, as materials on specific missions, for instance, are mostly unavailable. The limited access to documents sets an obvious limitation of the study and should be noted when assessing the results: As always in discourse analysis, the results should not be viewed as necessarily overarching, but representing the discourses of the materials used. However, as the materials have been chosen carefully and the discourses were rather similar in most documents, some level of generalization can be drawn from the results (Cheek, 2012).

Adding other types of materials, such as interviews, could have attained aspects or levels of the discourse beyond the strategic level, which are now left untouched. Nevertheless, I decided to only analyze materials, which I had not been a part of producing. There are different views on whether discourse analysis should only be used on "naturally occurring" materials, or can a researcher influence the production of the materials through interviews, for instance (see for example Jokinen, Juhila, & Suoninen, 1999, pg. 236–238). However, I maintain that using naturally occurring materials lowers the risk of the researcher leading the discourse too heavily. Adding additional data by conducting interviews or getting hold of some other materials more closely related to the operational level, could potentially retrieve interesting results and could, therefore, be considered as a valuable agenda for further research.

Lastly, I want to point out that the documents that I found with my searches could very well lack some documents, which could have provided valuable insights. However, as there is no specific set of documents or any database that would include all of these documents, there was no way of checking each document fitting the above criteria from every EU source. The chosen materials form an imperfect sample, which is also taken into consideration throughout the analysis. In addition, each document is available online for further analysis, as was mentioned before, and short descriptions of each have can be found in Appendix 2 of this thesis, so that it is possible to get a better idea of the sample and its content.

Altogether I ended up using 24 of documents in the analysis (Table 1). Apart from three Handbooks and one report on the work of the European Council, all of the documents were included in the analysis entirely. In the end the analyzed materials consisted of 494 pages, including title pages and so forth. Most of the analyzed documents included sections, which could be determined to have no relevance to the research topic. These sections were carefully read through in case they would disclose something. However, as some documents turned out to have a rather significant amount of sections, which had no relevant information for the analysis, not all the documents turned out to have equal significance to the analysis.

As the categorization of the documents (Table 1) demonstrates, the materials consist of a variety of different types of documents. Group A, Strategies, Council Conclusions and Concept Notes consists of strategic-guiding documents, which also highlight the values and priorities related to CSDP missions. Most of the documents in this groups are produced by EEAS, European Commission or the Council but there is also one document from the PSC. Group B contains Implementation or Action Plans, and Policy Frameworks, which set more

specific guidelines on how to achieve goals and guidelines stated in strategy papers. However, despite being called Implementation Plans, for instance, the documents contain general guidelines on implementation and do not go into operational-level details. The documents in group are all produced either by the European Commission or the Council

Table 1. Overview of the analyzed document categorized according to their types. The group codes are used in the Analysis and Results -chapter to identify the document types of the quotes used as examples. The Reference list and appendix offer further information on each document.

TYPE	GROUP CODE	NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS	EXAMPLES OF DOCUMENTS
Strategies, Council Conclusions & Concept Notes	**A**	**10**	The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) The Civilian CSDP Compact Council Conclusions on CSDP
Implementation & Action Plans, Policy Frameworks	**B**	**7**	Joint Staff Working Document: Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises: Action Plan 2016-17 The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015–2019 Joint Action Plan: Implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact
Implementation & Action Reports, Lessons Learned Documents	**C**	**4**	Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years On, Looking Forward
CSDP Handbooks (limited sections)	**D**	**3**	Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations Handbook on CSDP
		TOTAL: 24	

Documents in group C, Implementation or Action Reports, and Lessons Learned Documents, assess how well the Plans and Strategies have been implemented. They also point out

needs for improvement. These documents have been published by the Council or the EEAS. Lastly, group D contains three CSDP Handbooks, which each deal with basic concepts, practices and challenges related to CSDP missions. All these Handbooks state that they do not necessarily represent the views of the EU. However, their corporate authors include the European Security and Defence College embedded in the EEAS and they are used in training of civilian crisis management experts within the EU. This makes them suitable for being interpreted as a part of the discourses of the local within the EU structures. They provide a slightly different point of view from the other documents, as they are aimed at future civilian crisis management experts. The appendix at the end of the thesis provides a description of each document.

What should also be kept in mind is that many of these documents deal with a wider field of foreign policy, not only civilian CSDP missions. I had to pay close attention to which specific topic was being discussed throughout reading and analyzing the documents to stay within the chosen limits of the research question and avoid drawing findings from sections of the documents, which were not referring to civilian CSDP. However, at the same time there were also many instances, in which the stated principles or guidelines are meant to be cross-cutting throughout the field of EU's foreign policy and action. These sections were also analyzed because, though they do not specifically target civilian CSDP, they apply to it as it is a part of the EU's foreign policy.

The full list of the documents used in the analysis can be found at the end of the thesis in the Research Material References and the description of each document in the appendix, as was mentioned before. The next section introduces the documents used to analyze the discourse. To make this section clearer, I have divided the documents and their introduction by their respective types (Table 1). Having some knowledge and understanding of the documents included in the analysis is valuable, as it makes it possible to evaluate the discourses as emerging from their contexts. Understanding the contexts is considered a key aspect in the type of discourse analysis I use in this thesis (Dittmer, 2010; Häkli, 1998; Phillips & Hardy, 2002), as will be explained in more detail further on.

5.2 Theoretical Dimensions of Discourse Analysis

This section describes the method used in this thesis: discourse analysis. As discourse analysis cannot be described as a precise method in a sense that there are no universal instructions as to how to conduct it, it is up to the researcher to determine the steps and phases, which serve best to answer their research question (S. Taylor, 2013 pg. 1–4). I first present the basic principles and methodological assumptions, as well as its potential limitations, of discourse analysis in this section. Then I move on to a more detailed description of how I used discourse analysis in this thesis in the following section.

As was explained in depth earlier, what the viewpoint of human geography brings to this thesis, is the definition of scale and level as social constructs. I use discourse analysis as my primary method to explore and identify the various social constructions of the local level in the context of the EU's civilian crisis management, and what could potentially be some of the outcomes of these social constructions in terms of political opportunity structures.

Discourse analysis is a commonly used research method in many social sciences, including human geography (Dittmer, 2010). It offers means to study the situatedness of knowledge, how contexts affect discourses as well as the effects spatial images may have on social reality, for instance (Häkli, 1998). There are at least two distinct methodologies or approaches within the discourse analysis: structuralist and post-structuralist. What is central to both approaches is the underpinning idea that language and discourse have a fundamental role in enabling many social activities and the view that the purpose of discourse analysis is to "*explore the relationship between discourse and reality*." (Phillips & Hardy, 2002 pg. 3).

The most significant difference between the two is found in the extent they see discourse as establishing and formulating reality. Structuralists assume that a subject precedes the effects of the discourse on the subject, whereas post-structuralists presume that it is impossible to determine a subject in a pre-discourse form. In other words, the post-structuralist view of discourse states that discourses are not simply reflections or representations of the subjects, but are a part of formulating the subjects (Dittmer, 2010). Critical geopolitics approach to discourse also aligns with this point of view (Häkli, 1998), and so does the analysis of this thesis.

Following from the above, discourse analysis is a research method, which is underpinned by an understanding of the social world as socially constructed. It is therefore compatible with

the view of scales and levels, or space in general, as social constructs as is explained more in-depth below. Discourse analysis embraces a set of premises related to the constructive effects of language (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, pg. 5). Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen (1993), for example, state that discourse analysis is based on several theoretical assumptions, which can be derived from the works of Foucault, for example. First, language is seen as an entity constructing social realities. What this means is that language and its use does not simply describe the world around us, but gives meaning to, organizes, builds and rebuilds the social reality we live in (Jokinen, Juhila, & Suoninen, 1993, pg. 18–20), which is in line with the post-structuralist view of discourse mentioned before.

The above is a central point of the theoretical framework, which also underlies the social construction of scale and levels in human geography. Whereas other strands of geography take concepts such as "the local level" for granted and see them as rather neutral, the human geographical approach to scales and levels maintains that these concepts are laden with underlying assumptions, as was pointed out in a previous chapter. In the case of the local level, some conventions, which are often associated with it are, for example, "weak", "authentic", "original", and "primitive" (see for example Gibson-Grayham, 2002; Moore, 2008). The purpose of discourse analysis is to unwind these kinds of constructions (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 18–20).

The second theoretical norm is that there are parallel and competing aggregates of meanings, which exist simultaneously (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 24–29). In the context of discourse analysis, "aggregates of meanings" refers to the idea that language is a complex and ever-evolving system, and its elements are intertwined, and understood by relating them to one another (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 19–20). As there can be parallel and competing discourses, some discourses receive more attention than others. There is an ongoing rivalry where different actors can try to construct discourses which benefit them and push them to be adopted by other actors or institutions. Another supposition states that actors are attached to these aggregates of meanings. However, using language is not viewed as a portal to cognitive processes, and the focus and interest of discourse analysis is on the social practices, not the individuals (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 37–40).

Jokinen et al. (1993) also point out that meaningful actions are context-bound. What this means for discourse analysis is that unlike in some other research methods, discourse analysis embraces context as a characteristic to which the discourse is closely tied to, and which

enriches the analysis (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 29–36). Thus, the analyzed discourse must be seen and interpreted as a part of the context, and the analysis cannot necessarily be extended beyond the time and space frame of the analysis. Therefore, though these assumptions lead the researcher to study the used language carefully, one must be careful not to disconnect the texts and discourses from their context to avoid narrow or void interpretations of the materials. This requires taking into consideration the material contexts and practices and including them into the analysis. It is these contexts, which co-create meaning for the discourses, not the contents of the discourses alone (Häkli, 1998; Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Dittmer, 2010).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, using language produces consequences (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 41–45). What follows is that, as was brought forward in the Scale and Levels -chapter, even when scales or levels are not considered as material elements themselves, they can have material consequences and effects. Therefore, the point of discourse analysis is not to only disentangle the discourses but also how they are materialized in practices (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 28), and the choices one makes when using language and taking part in a discourse can also be seen as an exercise of power. The used language and the discourse it constructs can legitimize a hierarchical ordering of actors in some specific manner, for example. Looking at these ideological consequences and unveiling them through analysis can increase the social significance of discourse analysis, but also requires deep reflection on how the researcher is positioned and what kind of discourses the researcher is leaning on or fortifying (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 43–46). In this thesis I utilize the concept of political opportunity structures, which was also introduced in the Scale and Levels -chapter, to discuss the potential consequences the discourses might have.

In practice, discourse analysis can be used in a multitude of ways (S. Taylor, 2013, pg. 1–4) and it is characterized by a flexible take on methodology (Dittmer, 2010). Thus, every discourse analysis is the researcher's interpretation of the method (Ahonen & Kallio, 2002, pg. 70). The way I implement discourse analysis in this thesis can be defined shortly as a research method looking at language materials to analyze how meanings and social reality are produced through different social practices (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 9–10). The materials are, therefore, viewed as "evidence of phenomena *beyond the individual person*." (S. Taylor, 2013, pg. 2, original emphasis), or in this case, beyond the individual documents. Moreover,

in this thesis, the analysis of the discourse of the local level is also an analysis of the production of political space, which Häkli (1998), for example, argues should be problematized and researched to uncover or document the power structures it creates or is created by.

Limitations of discourse analysis include, for instance, the fact that the results provided by a discourse analysis are by no means exhaustive, and that the results are strongly context-bound (see for example Häkli, 1998; Jokinen et al., 1993). Therefore, it must be considered, what is the optimal way to contextualize the discourses, as well as where to stop these conceptualizations. Moreover, the researcher must realize that they also contribute to discourses with their work. Therefore, the position of the researcher should be presented and open for readers to assess (Cheek, 2012).

To sum up, discourse analysis does not focus on what a concept "really" or "naturally" is but how it is perceived in a specific context (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 20–21; Häkli, 1998). My approach in this thesis fits the post-structuralist approach to discourse mentioned above. I utilize discourse analysis to examine the social construction of the local level by looking at the discourses I find in the documents relating to the EU's civilian CSDP missions and discuss, what kind of political opportunity structures could emerge from these narratives. The next section explains the process I used in the analysis.

5.3 Discourse Analysis in Practice

As was established, in a broad sense, discourse analysis has two main phases: identifying patterns in the materials and locating the patterns and their functions within the greater context. However, there are no exact or specific guidelines on how these phases are to be applied, as discourse analysis can be done in many ways. What is common to all the different applications of the method is that intensive, attentive and exhaustive reading of the materials is required (Carbó, Ahumada, Caballero, & Gustavo, 2016). This section first briefly looks into the steps in the process. It then goes over the benefits of using software as an assist in discourse analysis, and, finally describes the phases of how I conducted the analysis.

5.3.1 Phases of Discourse Analysis

Though there is no single correct way to conduct discourse analysis (Cheek, 2012), some scholars have developed more detailed accounts of the phases of discourse analysis (see for example Kendall & Wickham, 1999; Carabine, 2001). In this thesis I used guidelines for analysis provided by Carabine (2001) to gain some more structure to the implementation of the discourse analysis. Her approach builds from a Foucauldian discourse analysis, which follows a post-structuralist methodology. The Foucauldian discourse analysis can be used to challenge the views of an aspect of reality, which has become to be viewed as "normal" or "natural", and is, thus, often taken for granted (Cheek, 2012). Thus, this approach fits in well with my purposes in this thesis since the focus is on the local level, which is often used as an intuitive concept.

The guidelines or phases of discourse analysis stated Carabine (2001) can be summarized as follows:

1. Getting to know the materials by reading.
2. Identifying relevant themes, categories and objects by coding the material.
3. Identification of preliminary discourses by analyzing quotes, codes and their connections.
4. Looking at whether there are any inter-related discourses.
5. Looking for absences and silences, meaning what is not mentioned though one might expect it; as well as potential counter-discourses, meaning discourses that state something counter to others.
6. Identifying the potential effects of the discourses on social reality.
7. Contextualizing the materials and findings.

It should be noted that despite the seemingly clear-cut list, the process of any discourse analysis is always dynamic, and requires going back-and-forth between different stages (Carabine, 2001). However, these steps functioned as a good starting point and reference especially at the beginning of the analysis process.

5.3.2 Benefits of Using ATLAS.ti

I used the ATLAS.ti software for the primary analysis of the documents. I find it a great tool for increasing the consistency of the level of detail and for supporting keeping track of findings. The fact that I had already used this specific software in as a part of a coursework, so its basic functions were already familiar to me, and that it is provided for use through the Download Centre of the University of Helsinki were the most pressing reasons for choosing ATLAS.ti and not another qualitative data analysis software.

The most significant advantage of software-assisted research is that the software can reduce or eliminate some of the limitations of an analysis based on paper and pen -techniques, or methods which rely heavily on human memory. Moreover, doing primary analysis using software can help the researcher with both attention to detail as well as zooming out and looking at the bigger picture created by the individual findings (Bazeley, 2013, pg. 17–18). However, when conducting analysis with the support of software meant for qualitative data, a researcher must stay aware that the software does not end up steering the research (Bazeley, 2013, pg. 17–18; Laajalahti & Herkama, 2018).

For instance, limited knowledge of the software in use can lead to using some specific tools, though they might not be well suited to answer the research question. Moreover, using coding to mark relevant phrases in the material easily leads to specifically looking at what is in the material, though in some cases what is left out might be equally interesting or meaningful for the analysis (Laajalahti & Herkama, 2018). These are referred to as the silences or absences (Carabine, 2001). Thus, it is important to stay aware of the potential risks of using software in analysis, get to know the potential as well as limitations of the software in use and to remember that the software is merely a supportive tool. The analysis is still in the hands of the researcher.

The ATLAS.ti software is very useful for storing and analyzing documents or other forms of materials used in research. At its simplest, it can be used to code quotes and other findings from these documents. As was just pointed out, the software does not do any of the analysis, but it does give support to the researcher in keeping track, managing and organizing the data in a meaningful way. Moreover, the ATLAS.ti software is highly useful in grouping and comparing data, for instance (Laajalahti & Herkama, 2018). Therefore, it can be used to help in finding different discourses.

5.3.3 Conducting the Analysis

For my thesis, I first created a new project in the ATLAS.ti software and then imported the materials into the software. Before moving into the actual primary analysis, I found it important to familiarize myself with the materials to prepare for what types of documents and information I was handling (phase 1 in the list in section 6.3.1). Naturally, a lot of this was done already in the phase of choosing the materials, but I also went through the materials after the selections had been made to familiarize myself with the documents further.

After carefully reading through the materials, I went through each document once again, coding potentially interesting phrases and terms (phase 2 in the list above), most of which in some way dealt with the broad themes I saw as relevant:

- images or definitions of the local;
- images or definitions of other relevant levels (with focus on how they relate to the local);
- images or definitions of the host country of international intervention;
- local ownership; and
- actors and roles in civilian CSDP missions.

Coding the materials can be done in many ways. Though it is a necessary step in many qualitative analysis methods, including discourse analysis, it is not sufficient for discourse analysis on its own. Rather, it is the primary analysis of the materials, which is the basis for the actual analysis of discourses found in the materials (Bazeley, 2013, pg. 125–127).

The last theme was added to identify, which other levels were mentioned in the documents, as the local level can only be understood in relation to other levels (see for example Howitt, 1998; Hughes, Öjendal, & Schierenbeck, 2015), as was established in the Scale and Levels -chapter. However, as was also brought up in that chapter, using pre-defined levels or scale can distort the researchers focus into paying attention to those levels and not others, which might be more significant in a specific case (see for example Marston et al., 2005; Moore, 2008). This could also give too much weight to levels that are essentially irrelevant in some cases. Therefore, I decided to not choose the other levels beforehand, but to identify them from the same documents while going through them. It was not until further into the analysis when I identified international and regional as the most relevant levels besides the local. Therefore, I specified the second point into “definitions and images of the international and

the regional" as the relevant other levels on my list, and also went through the materials again to find potentially missed relevant quotes related to these.

In addition to the themes mentioned above, I wanted to mark down quotes, which did not necessarily fit these themes directly but were still potentially interesting or noteworthy. In the end, most of these did not end up playing a strong role in the analysis, but they were useful in getting a better picture of the context of what the documents were about.

During the first round of coding, I did not have a clear picture of the discourses I was looking for, and therefore I decided to come up with codes and code categories while I advanced instead of creating a preset of code categories. These first codes were preliminary. As coding is a cyclical process (Bazeley, 2013, pg. 125–127), on further rounds I started to have some ideas of what kind of discourses might be included, and, therefore, I was able to create more analytical and specific codes as well as a group some codes together. Some of the codes I identified can be seen on the right side of Figure 2, which is a screenshot of the Quotation Manager in the ATLAS.ti software. The Quotations Manager shows quotations related to a chosen code, as well as which other codes the quote is related to, the document the quote is from and possible comments related to the quote.



Figure 2. The quotes relating to code "*actors: civil society*" are displayed here in the Quotation Manager. This screenshot was taken while the coding was still an on-going process.

I had slight troubles with one document on the operational-strategic level, as it contained a table which proved very difficult to code with ATLAS.ti. For some reason, the software had a hard time understanding the structure of the table, which made marking quotes to code neatly impossible. As the table was one of the main points of interest for me within that document, I did not want to skip it. Therefore, I decided to analyze the table's contents without ATLAS.ti and combine these findings with the others manually. This hinders the possibility to visually analyze the findings and their connections on this level, but all in all, I did not find this to significantly affect the final analysis or results.

In addition to coding, I also used the ATLAS.ti software to write comments on some of the quotes. These comments included information on why a specific quote is important and what kind of relations or associations it might have with other quotes. I also used comments to mark some sections, where there was no mention of any local actors, for example, though there was none. These were later helpful in the further analysis, as they were identified as the silent or absent points mentioned before and created interesting contrasts with some of the discourses. Besides the comments and codes in the ATLAS.ti software, I also made some general notes on paper to keep track of ideas and thoughts that came up through the process. These notes were extremely valuable when I was drawing some discourses and codes together and writing the results section.

After careful primary analysis of the materials in ATLAS.ti software, I moved on to analyzing the codes and quotes (phases 3–5 in the list in 6.3.1). For these phases I used different viewing options in ATLAS.ti to see, which codes were used most frequently, and which codes were often used together, for instance (Figure 2). I also created outputs of quotes relating to certain codes or code categories, such as "*actors*", to view more carefully what kind of discourses emerged from the materials with regards to the themes I was interested in. During this part, I also started actively writing down my findings and compiling them into results whilst simultaneously going back to ATLAS.ti to read through the materials again and looking for connections, similarities, and dissimilarities in the ways the relevant themes were brought up.

Moreover, I went through the documents again to mark quotes and codes, which had been missed on the first rounds, due to their relevance coming apparent only after some of the analysis had already been done. For instance, the relevance of regional as well as international actors and the contexts in which they were brought gained more importance in the

analysis on further rounds of coding. The final steps, phases six and seven on the list I section 6.3.1, were applied by analyzing the potential effects of the discourses as well as contextualizing the discourses. This was also done partly overlapping with the previous steps.

To get an initial overview of the emphasis the different levels got in the analyzed documents, I created a frequency table of the codes referring to local actors in ATLAS.ti. This was done using the ATLAS.ti's Analyze-section, and from there the Code-Document Table -tool, which allows the user to pick, which items to create a table from. I exported the table to Excel to create a clearer table (Table 2). The frequencies should not be interpreted as direct implications or evidence of which level is presented as the most important, for instance, but they were a good starting point into beginning to asses, which actors are mentioned most often, and which receive less attention in the documents.



Figure 3. The Boolean logic operator was used to search for sets of quotations that included codes or codes from three different code groups: local, regional and international. Screenshot from ATLAS.ti's Query Tool.

In addition to utilizing the analysis tool for creating the frequency table, I also created equations using Boolean logic operators in the ATLAS.ti -software's Query Tool to research my materials more thoroughly and identify potentially interesting pieces. For instance, I used the Boolean logic AND-operator to identify all of the quotes, which included codes in the local, regional or international code group (Figure 3). This allowed me to look at how often certain combinations of codes were present in the same quotation, for instance.

I initially had seven separate discourses of issues relating to the local level. However, as I moved forward in the analysis, I decided to combine some of them, as I identified some as being sub-discourses to larger discourses or circling around the same themes. Identifying, which discourses were strong enough to be represented as individual discourses presented a challenge, as most of the discourses had connections with others and many of them were also found side-by-side in the same documents. Therefore, the results can be viewed as a package of discourses, with very close connections. However, I decided to still present these as individual discourses because the purpose of discourse analysis is not to necessarily identify, which discourse sits above all others, but to understand the variety of discourses. In some cases these discourses can be even contradictory but still be present at the same time (Jokinen et al., 1993, pg. 37–40).

This chapter has presented the documents used as materials in the discourse analysis. It also gave an overview of how the analysis was conducted, and what are some of the potential limitations of it. It also drew together the theoretical aspects of levels in human geography with discourse analysis theory. The next section presents the findings of this analysis.

6 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As was mentioned earlier, the EU's civilian CSDP missions mostly focus on a number of key tasks, which include support for the rule-of-law institutions and police, for example. In all of the ten currently deployed civilian missions' mandates focus on supporting and advising national authorities, ministries and other national agencies on these topics (EEAS, 2019d). There are also civilian crisis management experts deployed to work in the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Special Prosecutors Office located in The Hague (CPCC, 2020). Judging by the civilian CSDP mandates, therefore, "the local" focuses on authorities, which is also evident from the results.

Nevertheless, in practice the local level can also be seen as much more extensive and cover actors beyond, or below, the national level, such as civil society organizations (CSO's) or municipality authorities. This is something I also encountered when working in a civilian CSDP mission. Though the mandate focuses on training, supporting and advising national authorities, other types of local actors can be involved in different processes and activities. This could include implementing trainings or partnering for an informative campaign, for

example, though perhaps to a lesser degree than authorities. In addition to pointing out local actors, which are often referred to, the analysis also looks into broader attributes given to the local level.

As I aim to not only investigate the discourses of the local but also how the local is presented in relation to other levels. I draw from Howitt (1998), for instance, arguing that each level can only be understood when placing it into the scale it resides in. This is also well in line with the idea of discourse analysis and the focus on the context: the discourses should be seen within the context within which they emerge. In this case it is the field of EU CSDP policies, but also the scale of levels that are seen as relevant in these policies. Therefore, in addition to looking at the discourses of the local I also look at the discourse of how it is related to the other most relevant levels and thus, what type of a scalar formation is created through these discourses. Finally, I end my analysis with a short conclusion drawing together the main findings and some interesting further questions.

I will discuss each discourse and bring forward some quotes that characterize the discourses to demonstrate them further. These quotes are mainly exact, meaning that I have not changed their wordings or spelling unless there were clear spelling mistakes. In some cases, I have shortened the quotes to avoid overly long quotes but to still include enough for the reader to understand the context. These shortenings are marked with "*[…]*" in the quotes. The quotes are separated from the main text with cursive and different text formation to distinctly mark them. Each analyzed document has been given a code (e.g. A1 or B4) with which they are easily recognizable from the reference list at the end of the thesis. The page numbers are also presented with the citations to make it easier to locate them in the primary materials.

6.1 Discourses of the Local Level

The key discourses pinpointed are *Local as Authorities or Government*, *Local as Civil Society*, *Local as Multi-Level*, *Local as a Threat*, and, finally, *Local as a Necessity*. None of them provide a clear-cut definition of who the local level comprises of or should comprise of, nor what kind of attributes the local level has. However, these main discourses give a good understanding of what types of issues are brought up in the analyzed EU documents with regards to the local level and local ownership. In addition, one important result of the analysis is the lack of clearer discourses and a limited amount of references to the local actors and

local level in general. It should also be noted, that the discourses are closely interlinked, and none of them stands alone.

To create a crude overview of the actors and institutions the analyzed documents refer to I created a frequency table in ATLAS.ti (Table 2). It is easily discovered from the frequency table that there are two codes, which stand out: civil society and authorities. This table was a good starting point for the analysis, but it should not be interpreted without further analysis. It gives only one side of the whole picture, as it does not tell much about the context of the mentions. Moreover, most of the codes hold a variety of actors, which could have also been analyzed as individual groups. For instance, the *actors: marginalized groups* -code refers to women, youth and general references to marginalized groups. These aspects and details are taken into consideration in the following sections describing the most significant discourses I identified.

Table 2. Frequencies of used codes in ATLAS.ti referring to local actors.

CODE	FREQUENCY
actors: civil society	46
actors: authorities	39
actors: local unspecified	20
actors: marginalized groups	15
actors: government	14
actors: national	10
actors: community	8
actors: non-state	6
actors: private sector	5
actors: mid-level	1
actors: municipality	1
TOTAL	**165**

6.1.1 Local as Authorities or Government

As was mentioned at the top of this chapter, the one group of local actors that is most obviously involved in processes related to civilian CSDP missions is authorities. This is also

evident from the analyzed policy documents. When combined, authorities or government are referred to more than any other group of local actors in the relevant sections of the documents (table 2). Titles used include both local and national authorities, security training institutes and security services, government and local government, for example. Though authorities are mentioned much more often in the documents than governments or other political entities, I have put these two groups together as they form a coherent group in the sense that the authorities mostly work under at least some government control.

The authorities are seen as the key recipient of training and advice, which the civilian CSDP missions often provide. Including the authorities into the process of a CSDP mission is seen as a crucial part to increase the sustainability and local ownership of the mission. The authorities are often referred to as "partners", as the below quotes demonstrate, which would indicate that they are treated as equals. This sort of language is seen throughout the documents. However, it is rather contradictory to another discourse introduced more in detail further on: *local as a threat*. It can be questioned, how can something, which is seen as a potential security threat be seen as an equal partner. Similarly, another issue comes from funding, because money flows tend to indicate power relations as well.

> *"The capacity building of partners is the objective of CSDP missions/operations with tasks in training, advice and/or mentoring within the security sector. The aim is to strengthen CSDP's ability to contribute more systematically to the resilience of partner countries recovering from or threatened by conflict or instability, in synergy with other EU instruments and actors, notably along the nexus of security and development."* ***B3, pg. 9***

> *"The Council acknowledges the inherent value of capacity building and the role for CSDP in supporting local actors and governments to de-escalate conflict and develop a political environment conducive to capacity building."* ***A3, pg. 3***

> *"During the Mission set up phase it is crucial to engage the authorities to whom strategic advice and capacity building is targeted. Therefore, the development of a Part-*

nership framework with the relevant national authorities provides a clear understanding of what the Mission will provide and what is expected from the counterparts in the process of Mission mandate and activities implementation." ***C2, pg. 24***

Following from the above, it can be said that the documents seem to assert the authorities as both agents that require change and development, as well as the key actors guiding the developments. They are, thus, both the target and the driver, which is an interesting setting. It can be argued that it is in line with the local ownership -mantra, which is also mentioned in EUGS, for instance, stating that "*Positive change can only be home-grown."* (EEAS, 2016c, pg. 27). However, it is a matter of further research on how well the authorities are able to steer the developments the mission aims for, and how much the steering comes from the side of the EU.

"Resilience requires a political approach. Governments have primary responsibility for catering for the needs of their populations, and international assistance should not be a substitute for local responsibility and political action." ***A9, pg. 23***

As in the example above, it is also stated in the documents that the primary responsibility for fulfilling the needs of citizens is seen to reside in the hands of the respective governments. This is a key component of the concept of sovereign states, which is enshrined in the Charter of the UN, for example (UN, 1945). In the context of civilian CSDP missions, this respect of state sovereignty is present in the sense that a mission can only be deployed if it is accepted by the government of the host country.

However, the EU can use its bargaining power by making a mission a part of a deal including other means of support or intervention as well, or by threatening to pull out development funds if a mission is not launched, for instance. Therefore, the final control on accepting or declining a mission may be in the hands of the host nation's government but saying no to the EU may lead to unwanted consequences for individual nations, if the EU so wishes. This is because the EU is the most significant funder of development cooperation (European Commission, 2020b) and is a massive market for trade (European Commission, 2019). This does not mean that the host nations have no room for negotiating but that the EU has powerful financial tools to bargain with. Nevertheless, defining authorities and governments as

the “key partners” in civilian CSDP missions is a necessity for the EU as they are needed to accept the mission and as targets of the mission.

In terms of political opportunity structures, the strong focus on authorities could be argued to provide rather narrow possibilities for local involvements. This is especially true from the viewpoint of political contention, which looks at the structural openness of the institution and its receptiveness to claims made by other actors (Princen & Kerremans, 2008). If authorities are seen as the central actors representing the local level in civilian CSDP missions, it leaves very little to question, who has potential access to take part in the process, which means that the rest of the local actors are categorically left out. On the other hand, focusing on such a clear group of actors provides clarity and could give authorities on both national and local level more weight in their claims to access the processes related to civilian CSDP.

Within this discourse, the other approaches to political opportunity structures, the exchange perspective, and the venue shopping perspective, might affect which actors within the authorities have the possibility to gain access. The exchange perspective sets the focus on how outside actors can gain access through mutual dependency or benefit (Princen & Kerremans, 2008). In the authority and government discourse the opportunity structures that emerge could be the possibility for local authorities of government to provide access for an EU mission. In this regard, the power is very much on the side of the local actors, as the EU needs their permission or request to deploy a civilian mission, as was already mentioned.

The venue shopping or jumping levels approach highlights how outside actors can attempt to move between institutions or levels to gain access to decision-making, or where they have a better chance of reaching their goals (N. Smith, 1990; Marston et al., 2005; Herod, 2008; Princen & Kerremans, 2008; Termeer et al., 2010). Looking at the local as authorities or government -discourse from this perspective would suggest quite limited opportunity structures. For an institution to become an authority or government level actor is not a simple task since they official entities, at least in most cases. However, in some circumstances it can be possible for actors or institutions to rally a substantial public popularity behind them, for example, and attempt to challenge the position of official authorities or governments. This could lead to a situation where the EU could see benefits in supporting institutions or groups, which oppose or challenge the official or ruling institutions.

Though not entirely parallel to the hypothetical example above and is not in the context of a CSDP mission, the EU’s support to the Syrian National Council over the government of

Bashir Al-Assad can be viewed as an example of the EU's capability to side with government opposing groups. A more conventional manner to attempt to jump levels could be for an organization or a group of people to become a political entity and aspire to become a part of the government and gain access to processes related to potential EU missions as well. However, as this type of actions generally take years, it is mostly a hypothetical possibility to use this as a primary means to gain access to CSDP processes. These more and less hypothetical examples nevertheless show that though this is perhaps the most challenging approach to political opportunity structures, there could be some opportunity structures provided from this approach as well.

6.1.2 Local as Civil Society

Besides the authorities and government, another group of actors commonly referred to in the analyzed documents is civil society. Based on my coding and analysis, civil society or civil society organizations (CSOs) are mentioned in the documents more than any other individual group of actors (Table 2). The number of references to the civil society was surprising to me, considering that the authorities are usually viewed as the key focus of civilian CSDP missions. On the other hand, however, the importance of civil society in crisis management and peacebuilding initiatives is widely accepted and argued for (see for example Verdeja & Smith, 2013), so this discourse falls well into that narrative.

The strong emphasis on civil society actors could partly result from the fact that some of the analyzed documents deal with the EU's foreign policy more generally, and not only civilian CSDP missions, as was put forward earlier. However, this does not diminish the significance of this discourse since most of the documents deal specifically with CSDP and even the ones that refer to foreign policy more generally should also apply to civilian CSDP, which is a part of the EU's foreign policy instruments.

The concepts of civil society or civil society organizations can be used to refer to a large variety of actors. The EU, for example, has established a definition for the term: "*Civil society refers to all forms of social action carried out by individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the State. A civil society organisation is an organisational structure whose members serve the general interest through a democratic process, and which plays the role of mediator between public authorities and citizens."* (EUR-Lex, 2020).

This definition, albeit vague, is also what can be presumed to be in use in the documents analyzed in the thesis, as they do not give alternate definitions or clarifications.

As the quotes below demonstrate, oftentimes civil society is mentioned as one in a larger group of actors. Therefore, I maintain that this discourse is closely connected to the other discourses, and it does not build an image of civil society forming the local level alone. However, the numerous mentions of it suggest that it is seen as a key component, which makes it a separate discourse worth discussing.

> *"When engaging in SSR support activities, the EU should:*
> *[…]; and*
> *- involve all stakeholders, including non-state and civil society actors, from the identification stage, to build the greatest possible consensus around interventions."* ***B5, pg. 8***

> *"The Council stresses the importance of local ownership, inclusiveness, resilience and sustainability of supported actions, by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society."* ***C4, pg. 3***

There are also statements in the documents indicating that the civil society can be approached as an entity, which can potentially cover for the lack or weakness of other actors like the quotations below illustrate. Therefore, though the main partners or targets of actions in civilian CSDP missions tend to be authorities, CSOs can be included in the processes in other types of roles.

> *"We will partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges. We will deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key actors in a networked world. We will do so through dialogue and support, but also through more innovative forms of engagement."* ***A6, pg. 18***

"Today's complex crises and widespread violations and abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms require ever more determined efforts by the EU. […] The EU will put special emphasis on ownership by, and co-operation with, local institutions and mechanisms, including national human rights institutions, as well as civil society." ***B1, pg. 7***

"Societal resilience will be strengthened by deepening relations with civil society, notably in its efforts to hold governments accountable. We will reach out more to cultural organisations, religious communities, social partners and human rights defenders, and speak out against the shrinking space for civil society including through violations of the freedoms of speech and association." ***A6, pg. 27***

On the other hand, the discourse also draws an image of clear power relations in this regard: the process of partnering with civil society organizations is selective and the choices are made strictly by the EU end. It is hard to think of many CSO's, which could have strong enough claims to force the EU to include them if they were not seen as beneficial to the mission or its implementation.

The strong emphasis of civil society has been praised by some scholars (see for example Lederach, 1997; Verdeja & Smith, 2013), but it has also been criticized quite strongly. Some scholars maintain, for example, that the capabilities and motivations of the civil society are often romanticized (Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015). Civil society actors are not criticized or presented as potentially challenging to work within any of the documents. They are only mentioned as actors or institutions that may provide solutions and support. Even in situations where other actors are not necessarily willing to work as closely with the EU, the civil society is presented as a backdoor route to increasing local ownership, as demonstrated by the quote below.

"In a crisis situation or in the immediate aftermath of conflict, when state institutions may be weak or absent, the early stages of EU support should pave the way for national ownership on the basis of a participatory process which includes civil society." ***B5, pg. 8***

The romanticized image of the CSOs and their capacities ignores the fact that these actors are heterogeneous like the rest of the society (Donais, 2009) and that they can even act as spoilers of post-conflict peace (Verdeja & Smith, 2013). They can have interests in protecting the rights of only one ethnic group, or rally for other discriminatory policies, for example. Their capacities also vary significantly from one organization to another and are often overestimated (Donais, 2009). In addition, as CSOs need outside funding, their independence can be somewhat questioned, especially if they are dependent on EU funding (Kuehne et al., 2008; Donais, 2009). Rivalry between CSOs for EU funding can motivate many of them to adopt essential EU values or priorities at the expense of local traditions, for instance. This can be argued to potentially lessen the level of local knowledge and ownership they actually provide to the mission.

The discourse highlighting the role of civil society actors as also relevant on the local level provides both similar and differing views on political opportunity structures compared to the ones mentioned along with the previous discourse. Civil society organizations are repeatedly brought up in the analyzed documents as potential partners, sources for local knowledge and actors to include in various CFSP activities, including civilian CSDP missions, which can be interpreted as an opportunity structure from the viewpoint of the exchange perspective: The CSOs are seen to provide knowledge and perhaps connections, which the authorities or government might not have. Moreover, as was mentioned above, in some cases the CSOs are viewed as potentially more willing to partner-up with the EU regarding certain themes, for instance.

In terms of the political contention perspective of opportunity structures, this discourse widens the group of potential actors to be included considerably compared to the previous discourse. In comparison to authorities or government, the civil society is a much more open and accessible forum. Thus, the possibility of including a strong presence of civil society actors and marginalized groups provides a platform for participation and inclusion to those, who are left out if only authorities and the political elite are involved in the processes. This could present an opportunity for people to organize to rally for causes relevant to them in the context of a civilian CSDP mission.

Lastly, from the venue shopping perspective, this discourse provides a seemingly easy access to the potential pool of actors and institutions the EU could work within civilian CSDP missions, because forming a new CSO or joining one is much more accessible to many people

than authority let alone government institutions. However, though the opportunity structures seem rather open from all of the three perspectives mentioned above, they are all hindered by similar issues. The field of CSO's is vast, and the documents give rather little insight into what type of CSO's could be included or in for which kind of tasks, apart from individual mentions of human rights advocates. This makes it difficult to determine if there are only certain types of civil society actors, which are preferred, or which provide what the EU is looking for in a civil society actor they could work with.

This open-ended definition provides the EU with chances to control the type of civil society actors case-specifically, which can make it difficult for NGOs and other civil society actors to judge, how they should frame themselves to be accounted for. Moreover, it is often bigger and more influential civil society actors that are the ones that gain the EU's attention. This is due to differences in capacities to lobby and market themselves, for example. Larger organizations or groups also tend to have wider contact groups and connections, which give them an edge over smaller actors. This can lead to further marginalization of already marginalized groups. In other cases, smaller CSOs can be viewed as faster and perhaps more flexible. Which aspects are valued most in the potential candidates lies in the case-specific decisions made by the EU, which can base the decision on its own needs (Donais, 2009).

6.1.3 Local as Multi-Level or Undefined

Though the abovementioned discourses give some insights into the actors most commonly referred to in the context of potential local partners or presenting the local level in other ways, it would be incorrect to claim that it would be the whole picture. In fact, one of the most visible and commonly found discourses in the analyzed documents defines local as multi-lateral and multi-level, or they do not give any definition as to what type of actors are considered local. In this case I use the term "multi-level" to emphasize that the EU points to actors on different levels *within* the host country.

The need for a multi-lateral and multi-level approach does not delimit to the actors within the local level but also incorporates international and regional actors. However, nearly all of the documents referred to the need to specifically include a variety of local or host country actors. These sections either use terms such as "multi-lateral" or "broad participation", or in

some cases they listed a variety of actors that could all be defined as local (see quotations below).

> *"We will pursue a multi-lateral approach engaging all those players present in a conflict and necessary for its resolution. We will partner more systematically on the ground with regional and international organisations, bilateral donors and civil society."* ***A6, pg. 29***

> *"It needs to be nationally driven and requires political commitment and leadership, inter-institutional cooperation and broad stakeholder participation to achieve the widest possible consensus."* ***B5, pg. 2***

> *"The involvement of local governments, communities and civil society stakeholders will be given particular attention."* ***A9, pg. 5***

I found mentions of at least 15 different host country actors, which were referred to in sections dealing with cooperation with the local level or local ownership in some other manner. These included government, private sector, cultural organizations, social partners, national authorities, local authorities, civil society, marginalized groups, women, community, neighborhood, and municipality, for example. What this demonstrates is that there is no unilateral definition for "the local" and it is seen to comprise of various actors. In addition to these various titles of actors, there are also many sections in the documents, which do not specify what kind of actors they refer to (Table 2) like the below quotations indicate. This sort of language further highlights the vague conceptualization of the local level and local actors within the analyzed documents.

> *"Shared analysis brings together all relevant EU actors and possibly other international organisations or local actors. […] Depending on the nature of the country/context, shared analysis may be conducted at different levels (local/national/regional)."* ***A7, pg. 8***

> *"The Council and the Member States commit to:*

[…]

14. Strengthen efforts within the framework of the EU Integrated Approach, to ensure ownership and buy-in at local and regional level in order to achieve effective and sustainable results." ***A5, pg. 8***

Another interesting point to consider is the potential scope of the local level. On the one hand, there are occasions in the materials when for instance "national" and "local" are separated (see quotation below). This would suggest that the local level is under a level covering the nation or the state. On the other hand, all of these actors mentioned in this chapter so far have also been described as local and "local" seems to be used as a synonym to national or state in some occasions. Therefore, the local level can be viewed as being constituted as a social construction spanning on multiple-levels and effectively having vary vague, or perhaps case-specific, boundaries. This also adds to the impreciseness of the concept of the local level in the context of civilian CSDP missions.

"The Council stresses the importance of local ownership, inclusiveness, resilience and sustainability of supported actions, by engaging with national and local authorities, communities and civil society." ***A4, pg. 3***

This type of vagueness and impreciseness has been vividly criticized in the literature related to the local turn or hybrid peace approaches. Many scholars argue that the vagueness and multiple different meanings given to the local level effectively make the concept un-useful (Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015; Mac Ginty, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015). They maintain that by leaving the local as an imprecise or undefined concept, it loses some of its legitimacy. Increasing "local" ownership does not necessarily increase the sustainability of the mission nor the emancipation of the locals if the chosen actor does not represent the masses or attempts to increase the benefits of a small elite, for example. As the concept can refer to so many different actors with differing mandates, functions and capabilities, it can be questioned whether the concept is very useful in this context at all.

I find this discourse to be very interesting from the perspective of political opportunity structures, and especially the contention approach. The discourse of the local as multi-level, multi-lateral or as undefined potentially provides both negative and positive consequences

for opportunity structures of the local level. On the one hand, it can be argued that by leaving the local undefined, the opportunity structures for local level involvement are less restricted in terms of which local actors can attain a role in civilian crisis management or with which the missions cooperate; There are not many actors, which could not fit into one of the mentioned groups or frame themselves as "local" when the local is left completely undefined. However, on the other hand, it also leaves the potential actors, who might want to be seen as key local owners of the process, without information about how they might better their chances of being included. This makes the opportunity structures very limited from the venue shopping or jumping levels perspective. Ultimately it is the EU who makes the decisions on who to include and who to exclude (see quotation below).

> *"The EU will bring together all relevant tools and those of its Member States as appropriate in support of a coherent strategy defined according to agreed political objectives at the EU level; […]"* ***A7, pg. 4***

> *"We will partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges."* ***A6, pg. 18***

For the EU, constructing the local level as a vague and varying entity can be viewed as leaving room for case-specific flexibility, as there are no actors named which must or must not be cooperated with or involved in the process. Therefore, the political opportunity structures defining who can reach different processes related to a civilian crisis management mission can be modified to fit each case. For the EU this means that they get to select their partners in case-by-case. These choices can reflect the needs of the EU or the needs of the host country. Therefore, this discourse would seem to provide the EU with the possibility to pick and choose their "partners", whereas the local actors have much less bargaining power in terms of who is invited to participate.

However, as was mentioned earlier, the current tasks of civilian CSDP stated in the Civilian CSDP Compact (EEAS, 2017d) all relate to authorities in practice. This means that disregarding the local authorities completely would be rather unlikely. Even in a situation where the local authorities would be missing or be extremely weak, the approval of the government would be needed, and, in all likelihood, some local authorities would still be involved in the processes. So far, the EU has had only one civilian CSDP mission where it has had executive

rights, EULEX Kosovo. The operation's mandate has since been modified several times, and the executive rights of the EU have been removed, but even with the executive mandate, the EU worked in close contact with local authorities with the aim of creating stronger rule-of-law institutions (see for example Chivvis, 2010). Thus, though the discourse does give the EU more possibilities in who to incorporate, the requirement to include authorities and government are still rather solid.

6.1.4 Local as a Threat

The three previous sections have focused on the question of "who" or "where" is local, and what kind of attributes these key actor groups are given. As the third discourse indicated, the local is multi-level and, thus, the questions of "who" or "where" cannot be answered very accurately nor universally. These next two sections step away from looking at "who" and focus on more general conceptions or attributes given to the local actors. The first clear discourse, about what the "local" is in the context of civilian CSDP missions, is that it is a potential threat to the EU and its citizens. This discourse is present in many of the documents, in one way or another, and it forms a tight binary with the next discourse, as will be explained in the next section.

The local as a threat -discourse presents an image of the local level, which is consistent with the views commonly associated with the liberal peace paradigm and some of the criticism related to the local turn: that the local is uncivilized and undemocratic, and thus fosters possibilities for incubating threats towards the EU (Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2015: 841; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017). The analyzed documents often state that the EU's security is closely linked to security outside the EU borders as the quotations exemplify. This is especially true for the EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016c), which refers to this on at least eight times.

> *"Internal and external security are ever more intertwined: our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions."* ***A6, pg. 14***

"It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests." ***A6, pg. 23***

As demonstrated by the below quotes, the discourse of local as a threat and the connection between internal and external security is also stated as one of the core justifications legitimizing civilian CSDP missions internally (EEAS, 2016c; EEAS, 2017a). Thus, without this discourse, the civilian CSDP missions might be much scarcer since it might be difficult to get MSs to support or fund them if only the host nation's interests were seen to benefit from the missions. As mentioned before, crisis management is highly political and not only ideological. This is a common feature of not just the EU's civilian CSDP missions but peacekeeping, peacebuilding and crisis management missions in general (see for example Paris, 2002). Therefore, the strong presence of this discourse in the analyzed documents makes sense. The documents may reflect the real views of the MSs, but the documents also communicate and justify the need for such instruments to MSs as well as the public.

"CSDP missions or operations outside the EU's borders can, directly or indirectly, support Europe's own security needs by fostering human security, tackling root causes of conflict and thus resolving crises and their spill-over effects into the Union." ***B3, pg. 10***

"But EU external policy, including through the CSDP, has also a role in directly contributing to resilience within our borders, at a time when the Union has a greater responsibility than ever before to contribute to the security of its citizens. That requires better detection of external pressures and threats, coupled with adequate mechanisms to ensure an appropriate political response." ***A9., pg. 15***

Reflecting on the effects this discourse potentially has on political opportunity structures is interesting, as it can be seen to have two potential effects, which oppose each other. On the one hand, it could be seen to block opportunity structures, as actors, who are seen as potential

threats are highly unlikely to be viewed as potential partners from any of the three perspectives to opportunity structures. On the other hand, however, it could also be viewed as increasing the opportunities for local involvement in EU CSDP processes.

The EU's approach to conflicts and crisis lies heavily on the premise of interlinked internal and external security as well as security-development nexus (EEAS, 2016c; European Commission, 2020b), as was mentioned above. The security-development nexus sets the focus on how weak states can provide places, where international security threats can grow and prosper, and how this, in turn, creates a threat to Western nations (see for example Buur, Jensen, & Stepputat, 2007), and perspective of interlinked internal and external security further stresses the last point. Therefore, it could also be argued that viewing the local level as a threat effectively encourages the EU to intervene through civilian CSDP missions, and thus also creates opportunities for local involvement that would not exist, if there was no mission. However, this latter effect on the opportunity structures is very imprecise and sits on the premise that local involvement is always included in civilian CSDP missions.

6.1.5 Local as a Necessity

Another key discourse in the documents is *local as a necessity*. Like the previous discourse, this also does not directly play into constructing who or where the local level is. Instead, it strongly highlights the importance of the local level and the need to include it in civilian CSDP missions. Therefore, this discourse increases the relevance of the other themes of this thesis as well as the other discourses; If the local level and its ownership are seen as a necessary element in all CSDP processes, it clearly emphasizes the need to study the local level more closely and to identify the other discourses related to it.

Phrases suggesting that the local level must be included in various stages and processes related to CSDP or CFSP come up in nearly all of the documents, and the discourse overlaps with many of the other discourses. As the quotes below exemplify, the local as a necessity discourse states that the local level and local ownership are needed for any external action to work. This discourse reflects the themes of the first local turn, emphasizing the effectiveness and sustainability, which the inclusion of the local level is supposed to offer.

"Promote and support local ownership and inclusiveness. Externally imposed approaches will not work, nor will purely top-down action. For any joint objective local ownership should occur through a sufficient level of support and commitment to implementation." ***A7, pg. 5***

"Local buy-in is key to such major, extensive developments. Every intervention is different and every situation requires a tailor-made solution. It is important to understand both the history of a place and the entire political and legal framework, so that all contexts and structures are clear to the ones providing support." ***D1, pg. 206***

Moreover, sections of the documents building into this discourse often stress that a top-down approach is not sufficient. Thus, I would argue that the discourse criticizes both actions done without any, or very limited, involvement of the host country actors as well as actions, which are solely imposed on or from the top-level within a host country.

"Positive change can only be home-grown, and may take years to materialise." ***A6, pg. 27***

"Council stresses the importance of the buy-in and ownership of the host country to ensure effective and sustainable results, and to thus contribute significantly to the resilience and security of partner countries. It emphasises that civilian CSDP responds to particular situations, based on EU priorities for external action and assessed needs and requirements of the host country." ***A3, pg. 2***

"Local ownership is the basic fundamental principle of a successful civilian CSDP Mission in any country." ***C2, pg. 24***

When conducting discourse analysis, it is also important to pay attention to silences or absences (Carabine, 2001). Therefore, I discovered an interesting contrast between the discourse of local as necessary and the fact that in most analyzed documents, as well as those documents that were browsed through in the process of choosing the materials, the local level receives rather slim attention beyond the mention of its importance. The local is seen as hugely important and necessary for the success of CSDP missions.

At the same time, however, very little effort seems to go into defining who, what or where the local is, or how the EU should engage in themes of local ownership. These absences or silences portray the criticism of scholars such as Donais (2009), who maintain that the interest international organizations pay to local actors is often very superficial. Based on the analyzed documents, it seems that actors relating to the local level and the importance of their inclusion have to be mentioned in policy documents to be in line with the EU's ambition with regards to local ownership, but the level of concreteness and detail is left at a very low level.

As I argued in the Local as Multi-Level section, this vagueness of definition can be interpreted as a sign of flexibility and case-dependent definitions. However, there are very few documents in the materials which would state that the local should be defined in a case-specific manner. Therefore, it is worth questioning, how far does the necessity reach beyond the policy papers. If the local is so necessary, it is also necessary to determine more closely what is local, or state that the local is defined on a case-to-case basis. Currently, neither seems to be done based on the analyzed documents.

In addition to the vagueness dilemma, another point undermining the credibility of this discourse beyond the documents is a contradictory binary it is a part of. The Local as a Necessity -discourse is closely linked to the local as a threat -discourse, as was mentioned above. The co-existence of these two discourses is a case-in-point of one of the binary critiques related to the local turns and hybrid peace (Donais, 2009; Mac Ginty, 2015; Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017). The local level is simultaneously seen as a savior of crisis management missions, as well as a great threat we need protection from and a root cause of conflicts. This is an interesting dichotomy, which highlights the complexities of local realities. Though local institutions and traditions can be instrumental in creating sustainable peace, in other contexts they can be spoilers of peace processes, for example (Kuehne et al., 2008; Bleiker, 2012). I maintain that this binary should be addressed more carefully to avoid romanticizing the local level and its institutions.

The potential reflections of the local as a necessity -discourse on the political opportunity structures are most likely positive. The view of local actors as necessary partners in civilian CSDP missions can be viewed as a strong motivation for the EU to open-up its opportunity structures and include local actors in the processes. However, from the venue shopping or jumping levels perspective this discourse encourages local ownership but does not clarify

the preferred actors in any way. This leaves the local actors without information on how to frame themselves to be able to argue for their involvement, which is in line with the challenges related to the opportunity structures on the Local as Multi-Level -discourse.

6.2. Local in Relation to Other Relevant Levels

As mentioned before, to gain a more comprehensive view of the local level as a social construction, it is also relevant to view the larger scale it is a part of. This includes the relation it has with other relevant levels in the processes related to civilian CSDP missions. The two other levels besides the local levels, which I found were most often mentioned in the EU documents analyzed in this thesis were *international* and *regional*. Thus, this section briefly shows what kind of attributes are attached to these two levels. However, the aim is not to analyze them as thoroughly as the local level, but to build a basis upon which it can be evaluated, how the local level is set up in relation to these levels in a broader view.

6.2.1 International and Local

As a brief overview, in the context of the analyzed documents, the *international level* seems to refer mostly to large, multinational organizations with a range of action beyond a specific region. Most notably, the EU sees itself as an international organization, along with the UN. The documents also state Nato as part of the international level, but it is not as relevant in the context of civilian missions as it mainly focuses on military action. In addition, a few of the documents briefly refer to "international NGO's" or "other strategic players", but none are specifically named, nor is the term defined in any way in terms of how large these organizations are or what type of themes they focus on, for example.

> *"The EU consults and co-operates with third parties throughout all phases of the crisis management procedure; it should be noted that this is without prejudice to the EU's decision-making autonomy. Consultations and co-operation are conducted, as required, with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), other international and regional organisations […]."* ***D2, pg. 44***

As the below quotations from the EU Global Strategy, Council Conclusions and Joint Communications demonstrate, the EU sees the international level as the one from which the EU's values and priorities, are drawn from. These include multilateralism and a rules-based global order, as well as building democratic states, for instance. The international level, especially the UN, is seen as the basis of these principles, which are also commonly associated with the liberal peace and hybrid peace approaches. The EU's civilian CSDP missions also follow these principles, as they are the core of any EU CFSP action.

> *"This is necessary to promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values. Yet we know that such priorities are best served when we are not alone. And they are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism."* ***A6, pg. 4***

> *"The EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. […] Through our combined weight, we can promote agreed rules to contain power politics and contribute to a peaceful, fair and prosperous world."* ***A6, pg. 15***

> *"RECALLING also the commitment of the European Union and its Member States to the promotion of a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core; […]"* ***A5, pg. 2***

> *"The EU should:*
> *- continue to support domestic efforts, tailored to the needs and context of each society, to build sustainable democratic states, accountable and transparent institutions, reform the security sector, strengthen the rule of law, broad-based inclusive growth and employment, participatory decision-making and public access to information."* ***A9, pg. 5***

Thus, the international level is presented as the level which determines the majority of the values and priorities on which the civilian CSDP missions are built upon, though local

knowledge is also brought up in some sections. Local knowledge is seen as useful and valuable as supportive tools to help implement the values seen as most important within the EU. It is also seen as the responsibility of the international level to support the other levels, and especially the local level (see quotations below).

> *"Particularly in fragile, developing and transition countries, SSR requires political, financial and technical support from international partners. With its global reach, wide-ranging external policies, instruments, tools and well- established presence and experience, the EU is well placed to support partner countries in this respect […]"* ***B5, pg. 3***

> *"By addressing these conflicts, sources of instability and other security challenges, the EU and its Member States are assuming increased responsibilities to act as a security provider, at the international level and in particular in the neighbourhood, thereby also enhancing their own security and their global strategic role by responding to these challenges together."* ***A1, pg. 2***

> *"In a more contested world, the EU will be guided by a strong sense of responsibility. […] We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to promote human rights."* ***A6, pg. 8***

However, despite this, I maintain that the international and the local level as not set against each other as mutually excluding binaries, which is a commonly addressed criticism (Paffenholz, 2015; Schierenbeck, 2015; see for example Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017). Instead, both levels are seen as relevant and their participation as needed, though their roles and amount of control over interventions and missions are very different, as was discussed with regards to the potential opportunity structures in the previous sections. The need for both levels is also highlighted by the local as a necessity -discourse described above and is in line with the hybrid peace approach.

6.2.2 Regional and Local

As mentioned above, in addition to the international and local levels, another often brought up level in these documents is the regional level. Like the other levels, the regional level is also not a clear-cut geographical area, but a social construction. The documents often refer to regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and list regional as one of the levels, where actors can reside (see, for example, quotations below). Therefore, I argue, that regional is a significant level on the scale of civilian CSDP missions, along with the international and local levels.

> *"[…] work closely with international partners including the UN and other multilateral and regional actors; […]"* ***A7, pg. 4***

> *"The EU will continue to promote and defend the universality and indivisibility of all human rights in partnership with countries from all regions, in close cooperation with international and regional organisations, and with civil society."* ***B1, pg. 8***

> *"Effective integrated stabilisation should always entail close engagement with international partners such as United Nations, NATO, OSCE, regional organisations, such as African Union, but also with various states, international NGOs, civil society organisations and the private sector."* ***A7, pg. 9***

However, many of the documents analyzed in this thesis mention the regional level or regional actors mainly in segments, which simply list relevant levels as the quotations above demonstrate. This gives very little to analyze with regards to how the regional level is conceptualized or what kind of attributes are attached to it. In retrospect, it could have been an interesting and beneficial addition to include documents focusing more on the regional level into the materials. However, this would have increased the quantity of materials to analyze significantly and would have partly breached the limits set for the thesis. Therefore, adding further materials can be viewed as an aspect, which could be done if further research was conducted.

What is interesting about the regional level in the analyzed documents is that it is presented together as similar to both international but also local actors. In some sections of the documents, the regional actors seem to be viewed as having a more parallel role with the international actors, and in others it is referred to more similarly to the local level actors. The quotations below illustrate these different categorizations. This may result from the large variety of actors considered regional, and thus its flexibility as a group of actors.

> *"Sustainable peace can only be achieved through comprehensive agreements rooted in broad, deep and durable regional and international partnerships, which the EU will foster and support."* ***A6, pg. 10***

> *"Enabling partner countries and regional organisations to increasingly prevent and manage crises by themselves through efficient EU support to their security capacity building is one of the most important tools in this endeavour."* ***B4, pg. 11***

One document in the materials, which does give some more insight into the regional level is the EU Global Strategy (2016). What is interesting is that in the EUGS especially, the regional level seems to be given attributes, which are often attached to the local level (see the quotation below). For instance, the expression of cultures and identities is something, which has been closely attached to the local turn and the call to increase local involvement (Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 26 - 27; Leonardsson & Rudd, 2015).

> *"Voluntary forms of regional governance offer states and peoples the opportunity to better manage security concerns, reap the economic gains of globalisation, express more fully cultures and identities, and project influence in world affairs."* ***A6, pg. 8***

This kind of view would indicate that the local level and the regional are treated as partly overlapping and perhaps competing for the same roles because of it. Nevertheless, these two levels, and the discourses building them, are not counter-discourses. In fact, there are no counter-discourses in the documents, as all of the documents are produced by the ones in power, and not those who are the subjects; A counter-discourse would require input from

the local level speaking for themselves (Moussa & Scapp, 1996) or an actor, local or not, challenging the dominant representations and discourses (Carabine, 2001). Yet, seeing the regional level as a contributor of some of the same, or similar, aspects that have been previously drawn from the local level puts the discourse of the regional level in the place of a partly competing discourse, which might partly override or takeover some aspects currently related to the local level. Therefore, it could be seen as a potential threat to the relevance of the local level in civilian CSDP missions.

6.2.3 The Scalar Structure

When it comes to the organization of the scale, the analysis of the documents reveals a somewhat unclear picture. On the one hand, when looking at how the levels of our interest here; local, international and regional; are referred to when they are mentioned in the same quotes, it seems that they are often put in one of two orders: local, regional and international, or the other way around: international, regional and local. This is demonstrated by the quotes below. This follows the common narrative of organizing the levels into a vertical or hierarchical scale, but it does not explicitly state it.

> *"Looking ahead, the EU can put ever more emphasis on conflict prevention as well as long term peacebuilding, and increasingly work in an integrated manner with Member States on the ground, as well as with all relevant international, regional, state and non-state actors in any particular conflict setting."* ***C4, pg. 24***

> *"In the pursuit of our goals, we will reach out to states, regional bodies and international organisations."* ***A6, pg. 8***

> *"[…] work closely with international partners including the UN and other multilateral and regional actors; and take a multi-level approach that acts at the international, regional, national and local community level."* ***A7, pg. 4***

As was pointed out before, the international level seems to be presented as the forum, from which the core values of, as well as the responsibility for, the civilian CSDP missions stem from. Therefore, though local ownership and knowledge are also pointed out as valuable and

important, the international level seems to be viewed as having at least moral high ground compared with the local and regional levels. The analysis and discussions on political opportunity structures further also highlight that the EU, which is a part of the international level, has considerably more power in decision-making related to civilian CSDP missions. Thus, I would argue that despite the rhetoric of local ownership and partnership, the international level sits on the top of a hierarchical scalar structure.

However, this does not mean that the hierarchy is absolute. As has been pointed out, the hosting nation needs to accept or request the civilian CSDP mission, giving the local level its own point of leverage if wanted. In addition, though the words highlighting local ownership can be partly rhetorical, the push for more local inclusion is evident as is the EU's dedication to it on paper (see for example Ejdus, 2017). This makes it

Regional actors, on the other hand, are presented as having similar roles with both the international and local actors, as was established above. This is very interesting in terms of the effects it may have on the scalar structure. The regional can be seen to possess parallel or overlapping attributes with both the international and local levels, making it perhaps more networked with both. It also highlights the fact that the international, regional and local levels can be further divided into more specific levels, as do the remarks on the multi-level discourse on local. Thus, the three levels that have been discussed in this thesis should not be seen as the only options for levels of observation or actors.

All in all, I would argue that the scalar structure presents qualities, which I interpret as the stereotypical top-down scale. Nevertheless, the emphasis on local actors and local ownership indicates that the hierarchy is not absolute and that there are efforts to increase the quality and number of networks between the levels, which could break the hierarchy further. The overlap of some of the features or strengths of actors seen as regional and local could potentially highlight the importance over one or the other level while making the other less relevant, or increase the networks between these levels and, thus, increase their combined relevance in this context. However, to better identify the effects and the relations and dynamics between the levels would require more materials exposing the discourses related to the regional level.

6.3 Conclusions from the Analysis

In total I presented five discourses of the local from the documents. It is hard to distinguish, which of these would be more powerful than the others, as many, if not all of them, overlap or link to one another. There is very little juxtaposition between them, except perhaps between the local as a threat and local as a necessity -discourses. It is also worth noting, that the discourses overlap within and between documents, indicating that different actors within the EU have similar views on the local actors and local ownership. I also attempted to look at how the local level relates to other relevant levels within the sphere of the EU's civilian crisis management to uncover more about the status of the local level. Though the results of both sections of the analysis were less than conclusive, they highlighted some though-provoking

One interesting finding from the documents is that they parade local ownership, case-specific responses and the responsibility of governments to take care of the needs of the population, while simultaneously promoting features often associated with the liberal peace paradigm, such as democracy. This would indicate that based on the analyzed documents, the EU's approach to crisis management aims to follow more in line with the hybrid peace approach: promoting the values and priorities, such as building democratic states and liberal economies, which are seen as ideally universal, but emphasizing the need for case-specific implementation of these priorities. The prime reasoning and justification for the need for case-specific implementation seems to be found from improving the efficiency and sustainability of the results of the intervention. Therefore, the EU's approach towards local ownership appears to be closer to the first local turn. The emphasis on the emancipation of the locals addressed by the second local turn does not seem to surface in the analyzed materials. An interesting theme for further study would be to research, whether case studies of missions have come to similar conclusions, or whether they find more evidence on other approaches.

In an attempt to bring together the discourses and findings, based on the analyzed documents, the local level in the context of the EU's civilian CSDP missions could be described as follows: *A multi-level or vaguely defined entity, which is likely to include at least authorities and most likely some civil society actors, and which is considered simultaneously as a potential source for threats as well as a necessary component in increasing chances for sustainable peace.* Unfortunately, being so broad and vague, this definition does not give us too

many useful insights into increasing local ownership. Therefore, a more case-specific definition is called for both in research and in the field.

All in all, it was interesting to see, that though the local level and local ownership are highlighted as key issues to be included in a civilian CSDP mission, the attention they get in documents on the political-strategic level seems considerably low. This is especially evident when considering that the materials comprised of over 450 pages, and in total there were only 165 referrals to local actors. Moreover, most of these referrals overlap with each other in the sense that there are multiple actors or institutions mentioned in the same instance as a list, for example, bringing the number of sections discussing local actors even lower.

Based on the analyzed documents the local is simultaneously presented as a source of potential threats as well as a source of capacities ready to be supported to build a secure and well-functioning state. The local is also a necessary component to include for the intervention to succeed. In the two latter cases, the local level is often presented as a vaguely defined, yet almost righteous or noble in the sense that it is seen to contain the key to sustainable peace. It can be questioned, however, whether something so vaguely defined can be given this sort of status in reality, or whether such wordings act more as a mere rhetorical means to make the documents and the actors behind them seem more effective and inclusive while giving very little guidance or principles to follow in the real world.

On the other hand, these views could also partly result from the narrow accessibility to relevant documents. More information about the conceptions could possibly be found, if other types of documents could have been included in the analysis, or perhaps a larger quantity of similar documents would have provided other types of answers. The final chapter of this thesis will dig deeper into the discussion and reflection on some of the limitations of the analysis as well as pointing out points for further research.

7 DISCUSSION & REFLECTION

To conclude this thesis, I will discuss and reflect on the process and its limitations, as well as their potential effects on the results of my analysis, and point out some aspects, which would require further research. The first limitation was choosing and narrowing down the

research question, which is a vital step in any study. Without a clearly enough defined question or case, a research project can grow out of its scope or retrieve rather vague results. Therefore, a researcher must carefully consider, how to define the case, and why is that specific case interesting or important to study (Erikson & Koistinen, 2014, pg. 5–6). In this thesis, I chose to look at what the local level is a social construction in the context of the EU's civilian crisis management. Though terms such as "local ownership", "local agency" and "local participation" seem to be buzzwords, popping up in many of CSDP's guiding documents, such as the EU's Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016c), it has not been clearly defined, what exactly is meant with these terms.

In retrospect, however, a more narrowly defined research question or another set of materials could have provided more specific results. The research question is quite widespread because the context of the EU's civilian crisis management is not a tightly bounded activity. It contains different kinds of missions and mandates, and the number of actors and bodies is very big. Thus, the results are not as specific or as conclusive as I would have hoped, though they contain interesting findings and discussions. Including analysis and discussion on political opportunity structures further widened the scope of the analysis, but it also makes the analysis more interesting. Instead of attempting to only look at what the discourses are, the discussions on political opportunity structures enable some assesses on what these discourses mean for the local level and local ownership in this context. I maintain that these discussions form some of the most interesting parts of the results.

The current research question and framework are partly due to the limited access to materials to analyze. Before starting this project, I was partly aware of this limitation, but the true limits of access were only revealed during the process. Finding and choosing suitable materials became one of the biggest challenges in the process. The highly restricted access to documents as well as their scope covering only official documents is a limitation that should be noted when assessing the results. It should also be emphasized again that the results represent the analyzed documents and my interpretations of the findings in them. They do not necessarily, or even likely, cover all of EU's discourses concerning the local level. If other documents would have been chosen or discovered, other discourses may have been pointed out. Therefore, an idea for further research could be to add further materials through interviews, for instance. This could also allow the research to focus on a specific mission, which was not possible with the materials available for this thesis.

One aspect that can be criticized about this thesis is that it has a top-down approach. There was no local input, though the focus is on the local level. This is somewhat ironic considering that it is something I criticize in my thesis: the narrative of the local level is to a great degree still in the hands of the international organizations, such as the EU, despite using the rhetoric of the local turns and increasing local ownership. The top-down approach reflects many international interventions, however, which tend to have strong top-down features within them (Richmond, 2006). Therefore, it is also important to investigate how the local is defined from a top-down perspective. The approach is something that should be kept in mind when going through the results. They should only be viewed as one approach and one set of discourses on the local level and how it is viewed from the perspective of the EU.

It would be both interesting and highly valuable to conduct similar research that would take a more bottom-up approach and study how the local level is constructed by local actors as well as international actors on an operational level. Especially the counter-discourses raised from the local actors could bring significant input. Comparing between these, as well as their compatibility with the discourses uncovered in this thesis, would be a very relevant theme to study.

Besides missing actors from the local level, another point worth noting is that civilian CSDP missions should be a part of an integrated approach combining various EU activities (EEAS, 2017c: 6). Thus, looking at civilian crisis management alone does not necessarily uncover the whole picture. The role of EUSRs and EU Delegations in coordinating and cooperating with various local actors was brought up in some of the analyzed documents. It could be interesting to research, how the cooperation between missions and delegations works. In the mission I did an internship in, I saw rather little cooperation, but it might take place upper on the hierarchy.

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the local level from the perspective of the EU through the strategic papers and other documents dealing with civilian CSDP missions. Based on these materials and analysis I cannot argue whether or not the EU's civilian CSDP missions follow the guidelines and strategies discussed in the materials. Therefore, another interesting point would be to see, whether these findings correlate with the reality in the field. The more strategic-level approach to the subject in this thesis provided interesting insights and provide a basis against which more case-specific research operational-level research could be compared.

With regards to the human geographical concepts utilized to form the framework of this thesis, it should be noted that scale and level are not the only form of spatiality or dimension that shape politics and the socio-spatial landscape. Disregarding the other dimensions, such as place or networks, may have impoverished the analysis, possibly missing out on important features relating to other spatialities as well the connections and co-implications between socio-spatial dimensions (Marston et al., 2005; Leitner & Miller, 2007; Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008; Leitner, Sheppard, & Sziarto, 2008). Jessop et al. (2008) also point out, however, that an approach utilizing only one dimension of spatiality can be an entry point to simplify a more complex analysis. Paasi (2008) notes, moreover, that concepts rarely offer perfect descriptions of the real world; their purpose is to highlight some aspect of the phenomenon. Often this causes the other aspects to be downplayed but does not deprive the analysis of its value. Therefore, the choice to focus on a scale and levels is justifies, but considerations of other spatial dimensions could have elaborated the analysis further.

If I were to do this thesis again, I would probably do some things differently, but it has been a learning process and I have learned a lot. The process has simultaneously furthered both my knowledge and interest in the topics of local ownership and civilian crisis management, as well as the theoretical and methodological aspects applied in the thesis. The thesis has probably raised equally many questions as it has answered, as can be seen from the many points of supplementary research listed above. One of the key conclusions of the thesis is, therefore, that the theme should be receive more attention from both academia as well as experts working in the field, if we want to increase local inclusion and local ownership.

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RESEARCH MATERIAL REFERENCES

The research materials are categorized according to document types and the groups are marked with letters A–D. Within the categories, the materials are coded and organized primarily in an alphabetical order according to the author/institution, and secondarily by year. The descriptions of each document can be found in the appendix organized with the same codes.

GROUP A. Strategies, Council Conclusions, and Concept Notes

A1. Council of the European Union (2015). *Council Conclusions on CSDP*. Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24520/st08971en15.pdf* (7.3.2020)

A2. Council of the European Union (2016). *Council conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR).* Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24227/ssr-st13998en16.pdf* (7.3.2020)

A3. Council of the European Union (2017). *Council Conclusions on strengthening civilian CSDP*. Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/05/28/strengthening-civilian-csdp-council-adopts-conclusions/* (3.2.2020)

A4. Council of the European Union (2018). *Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises.* Retrieved from *https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5413-2018-INIT/en/pdf* (4.2.2020)

A5. Council of the European Union (2018). *Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact.* Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37027/st14305-en18.pdf* (3.2.2020)

A6. EEAS (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. Retrieved from *https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf* (4.2.2020)

A7. EEAS (2017). *EEAS/Commission services' issues paper suggesting parameters for a concept on Stabilisation as part of the EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises.* Retrieved from *http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15622-2017-INIT/en/pdf* (4.2.2020)

A8. EEAS (2017). *Draft list of Generic Civilian CSDP Tasks and Requirements*. Retrieved from *http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6166-2017-INIT/en/pdf* (6.2.2020)

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A10. PSC (2017). *Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations*. Retrieved from *http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6818-2017-INIT/en/pdf* (3.2.2020)

GROUP B. Implementation and Action Plans, Policy Frameworks

B1. Council of the European Union (2015). *EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.* Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30003/web_en__action-planhumanrights.pdf* (4.2.2020)

B2. Council of the European Union (2016). *Joint Staff Working Document: Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises: Action Plan 2016-17.* Retrieved from *http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11408-2016-INIT/en/pdf* (5.2.2020)

B3. European Commission (2016). *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*. Retrieved from *https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14392-2016-INIT/en/pdf* (5.2.2020)

B4. European Commission (2015). *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises*. Retrieved from *https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8504-2015-INIT/en/pdf* (10.2.2020)

B5. European Commission (2016). *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: Elements for an EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform*. Retrieved from *https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/sites/fpi/files/docs/news/join_2016_31_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v2_p1_854572.pdf* (4.2.2020)

B6. European Commission (2017). *Joint Staff Working Document: EU resilience policy framework for cooperation with partner countries and evaluation of related implementation actions*. Retrieved from *https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10184-2017-ADD-2/en/pdf* (5.2.2020)

B7. European Commission (2019). *Joint Action Plan: Implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact.* Retrieved from *https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8962-2019-INIT/en/pdf* (6.2.2020)

GROUP C. Implementation and Action Reports, Lessons Learned Documents

C1. European Council (2018). Facing Geopolitical Realities. In: *Striving for unity: The European Council, May 2016 to June 2018* (pg. 16–23). Retrieved from *https://www.consilium.europa.eu/fi/press/press-releases/2018/07/25/striving-for-unity-the-european-council-may-2016-to-june-2018-report-by-donald-tusk-president-of-the-european-council/* (5.2.2020)

C2. EEAS (2017). *Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Report*. Retrieved from *http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9159-2017-INIT/en/pdf* (5.2.2020)

C3. EEAS (2018). *From Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Implementation Report Year 2*. Retrieved from *https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_annual_report_year_2.pdf* (5.2.2020)

C4. EEAS (2019). *The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years On, Looking Forward.* Retrieved from *https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy/64034/vision-action-eu-global-strategy-practice-three-years-looking-forward_en* (29.2.2020)

Group D. CSDP Handbooks

D1. Fihl, Maria (2015). Local ownership and cooperation with civil society. In J. Rehl & G. Glume (Eds.), *Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations* (pg. 205–208). Retrieved from *http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/european-security-defence-college/pdf/handbook/final_-_handbook_on_csdp_missions_and_operations.pdf* (3.2.2020)

D2. de Kermabon, Yves (2017). Crisis Management Procedures. In J.Rehl (Eds.) *Handbook for Decision Makers*, (pg. 43–48). Retrieved from *https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/07e87dbb-e9dd-11e6-ad7c-01aa75ed71a1* (3.2.2020)

D3. Fearon, Kate & Picavet, Sophie (2017). Challenges for Civilian CSDP Missions. In J. Rehl (Eds.) *Handbook on CSDP*, (pg. 89–97) Retrieved from *https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/handbook_on_csdp_-_3rd_edition_-_jochen_rehrl_federica_mogherini.pdf* (3.2.2020)

APPENDIX

Descriptions of the Analyzed Documents

This appendix contains short descriptions of each analyzed document. The descriptions are ordered according to the Research Material References list before and uses the same coding to identify each document. Thus, the references to the documents can be found in the list of Research Data References.

GROUP A. Strategies, Council Conclusions and Concept Notes

A1. *The Council Conclusions on CSDP* from 2015 includes a variety of conclusions and suggestions on how to improve EU's CSDP. However, what is rather interesting is that increased inclusion of locals or improving local ownership is not specifically on the agenda. Instead, the focus is more on coordination between various EU instruments and Member States, as well as EU and other international and regional organizations.

A2. *The Council Conclusions on EU-wide Strategic Framework to Support Security Sector Reform (SSR)* states points of emphasis and generic guidelines that the SSR efforts should follow. These include, for instance, points on setting the SSR actions into a wider context of EU actions and tools and coordinating with relevant actors.

A3. *The Council Conclusions on Strengthening Civilian CSDP* was published in 2018. The document focuses on how to improve the civilian side of CSDP specifically. It emphasizes that civilian CSDP provides unique and valuable possibilities to the EU as an international security actor. There are some mentions of benefitting from increased local ownership, but the focus is on improving the cohesion between EU instruments, and the local is effectively left on the side.

A4. *The Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises* stresses that the EU has a vast variety of instruments and actors within it, which can be utilized in an integrated model of crisis management. It also states that local buy-in is essential for CSDP missions and that a variety of actors should be included. An integrated approach is identified as a multi-phased and multi-lateral effort.

A5. *The Conclusions of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, on the establishment of a Civilian CSDP Compact* is another key document in the field of civilian CSDP missions. It was issued in 2018 and states strategic guidelines aiming to strengthening civilian CSDP. It also contains proposals on how to achieve these aims in addition to the Council's and MSs' commitments to work towards these goals. There is a total of 22 commitments, which the Council and MSs sign to in the document. These include increasing the number of seconded experts to 70 % of the international mission staff, and various tasks that aim to enable faster deployment of new missions when needed.

A6. *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*, or the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) for short, is the EU's strategic doctrine on CFSP published in 2016 by the EEAS. It aims to improve the effectiveness of the EU's foreign security and defense policies. It is one of, if not *the*, key documents guiding EU's foreign and security policy, which also makes it one of the key documents for the analysis of the discourse on the local level in civilian crisis management missions. The purpose of the EUGS is to offer strategic guidance on the security and defense priorities, which are crisis management, the EU's partners' capacity-building and protecting Europe. Out of these, the first is the most central to this thesis.

A7. The *EEAS/Commission services' issues paper suggesting parameters for a concept on Stabilisation as part of the EU Integrated Approach to external conflicts and crises* is a working paper aiming to establish a definition of the concept of stabilization within the context of CSDP missions. In addition, it states guiding principles of stabilization, including promoting local ownership and inclusion, building an integrated approach and avoiding premature dis-engagement. It also discusses the EU tools that can be used in stabilization efforts that includes CSDP missions.

A8. *The Draft list of Generic Civilian CSDP Tasks and Requirements* is a working document from 2017 produced by the EEAS to the CIVCOM. The document contains a list of requirements identified in association to tasks enhancing the effectiveness and capabilities of civilian CSDP missions. Though the theme of this document was promising in terms of dealing with themes relevant to this thesis, the focus was largely on the EU's instruments and local

actors were not referred to often. However, these were also important remarks with regards to the discourses of the local in relation to the international.

A9. *The Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action* was published in 2017 and comprises of working guidelines on how to increase the effectiveness of EU external action through enhancing the strategic concept of resilience. It stresses that in todays interconnected world there is a need for a political approach towards resilience. With regards to inclusion of the local level, this document emphasizes the need to include actors multi-laterally.

A10. *The Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations* document was produced by the Council of EU and includes ideas and notes on how the planning and conduct capabilities could be improved or reinforced to deploy CSDP missions faster and with increased quality. These actions are aimed also at enhancing the implementation of a comprehensive approach further. It was published in 2017. Most of this document is focused on EU tools, and, thus, its input to the discourse of the local level is mainly non-direct.

GROUP B. Implementation and Action Plans, Policy Frameworks

B1. *The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015 – 2019* (Action Plan) was adopted by the Council in 2015, and it includes principles and guidelines on how the EU aims to support democracy and safeguard human rights globally. A renewed Action Plan for the period of 2020 – 2024 is planned to be adopted by the Commission (European Commission, 2020a), but it has not been released at the time of finishing this thesis in April 2020. Therefore, I included the previous Action Plan, though the period of its implementation ended last year.

The Action Plan is not specifically focused on CSDP missions, but the principles and guidelines of the Action Plan are cross-cutting in EU's external action and also applies to civilian CSDP missions. Those statements, which specifically concentrate on humanitarian assistance or development cooperation, for instance, have been left out of the analysis. The Action Plan is one of the few documents within the EU's openly available sources of information, which explicitly states actions for the improvement of local ownership, making it extremely

relevant for the thesis. The Action Plan includes a strategic framework on human rights and democracy, as well as specific actions and objectives to boost local ownership, for example.

B2. *The Joint Staff Working Document – Taking forward the EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflicts and Crises - Action Plan 2016 -17* was published in 2016 by the European Commission. It includes planned and prioritized actions for implementation in 2016 and 2017 in order to improve the comprehensive approach. The actions are divided under some key focus areas such as joint analysis, conflict prevention and working with partners. The document focuses on EU instruments and organizations, which is to some extent expectable, and the local level hardly mentioned as an actor and is treated more as a target.

B3. *The Implementation Plan on Security and Defence* was produced by the HR/VP in 2016. It builds on the EUGS and was the basis for conclusions adopted by the Council. It focuses on implementing themes issued in the EUGS, setting a renewed level of ambition to the EU's CSDP and including guidelines on how to achieve this level. The document highlights building the locals capacities and protecting EU citizens in all CSDP actions, for example. However, this Implementation Plan focuses more on EU instruments and international and regional orders as the actors in CSDP missions.

B4. The *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises* was published in 2015 by the European Commission. It emphasizes the importance of the security-development nexus and presents CSDP missions as one of the tools in the EU's possession that may be used for conflict prevention and strengthening of the security situation in conflict areas. It also highlights that even with the comprehensive approach there was need to increase sustainability and efficiency of actions aiming at building the EU's partners' capacities. Though, the main focus of this document lays in various EU funding instruments used in CSFP and CSDP actions, it also includes sections, which highlight the importance of local ownership that are more useful for the analysis.

B5. The *Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Elements for an EU-wide strategic framework to support security sector reform* from 2016 highlights right from the beginning that SSR efforts need to be locally driven and inclusive in order to be effective and lasting. It aims to promote actions and principles, which would enhance the EU's SSR actions in conflict areas and potential conflict areas. The document also stresses the inclusion of women and youth as actors in SSR processes (European Commission, 2016).

This document proved to be one of those, which discusses the role of the local level more, and was, thus highly relevant in the analysis.

B6. *Joint Staff Working Document – EU resilience policy framework for cooperation with partner countries and evaluation of related implementation actions* is a document produced by the European Commission in 2017. It summarizes how the EU applies the concept of resilience in its external action and looks back at some lessons learned in the field.

B7. *The Joint Action Plan Implementing the Civilian CSDP Compact* is a joint staff working document from 2019 published by the European Commission. It includes proposals for concrete actions, which the EEAS and the Commission services should undertake to support the implementation of the Civilian CSDP Compact. As the Civilian CSDP Compact mostly includes actions to be taken on by Member States, the focus on not on the local level. However, this implementation plan still contributes to the discourse, as it does give some insights into the relationship between different levels.

GROUP C. Implementation and Action Reports, Lessons Learned Documents

C1. *Striving for unity: The European Council, May 2016 to June 2018* is a report of the work and actions of the European Council. From this document I included a chapter called Facing Geopolitical Realities because it contained sections dealing with the threats facing the EU from the outside. This provided some insights into what the local level was viewed as, but the document did not prove to be very significant for the analysis, as it mainly dealt with issues other than external action and crisis management.

C2. The *Annual 2016 CSDP Lessons Learned Report* is a document listing lessons learned since 2013 up until the beginning of 2016 related to CSDP missions which have not been implemented to an acceptable level before the end of 2016. In addition, there are findings and key recommendations from 2016, which are explained in more detail. In both sections, these lessons deal with all stages of the missions from initial planning and information sharing to implementation and exit strategies. The document was produced in 2017 by the EEAS for the PSC, and it was also distributed to the CIVCOM, for example.

C3. & C4. In addition to the EU Global Strategy (**A6**.) itself, the materials also include two reports focused on its progress or implementation. They have been published by the EEAS

in 2018 and 2019. These documents review and draw together the progress made in the implementation of the EUGS in the second and third years since the publication of the Strategy in 2016. The second year implementation report *From Shared Vision to Common Action: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy – Implementation Report Year 2*, as well as the third year progress report, *The European Union's Global Strategy – Three Years On, Looking Forward* both emphasize that the points indicated in the EUGS are more important than ever, since the world has seen an even further decrease in the influence of multilateral orders, namely the UN, which calls for stronger regional orders, such as the EU. Interestingly, though the EUGS (**A6**) strongly points to the importance of local ownership and the need to support it more, these progress reports looking at the implementation of the EUGS have no direct mention of local ownership. Moreover, the focus is set quite distinctively on EU institutions, international organizations and regional orders, and local actors are not brought forward as much in any of the reports.

Group D. CSDP Handbooks

D1., D2. & D3. There are sections of three CSDP Handbooks included in the material. It is stated in each of these, that each chapter represents the views of the writer. However, their corporate authors include the European Security and Defence College, which is embedded in the EEAS, and they are used in training of civilian crisis management experts within the EU. This makes them suitable for being interpreted as a part of the discourses of the local within the EU structures. Each Handbook has a different focus point, but they all aim to build knowledge and awareness of CSDP missions as well as the actors and priorities involved.

From *the Handbook on Mission and Operations* I analyzed chapter 2.5.3 Local Ownership and Cooperation with Civil Society Written that is by Maria Fihl. The chapter is situated under a wider section named Challenges, which is an interesting set-up and context. Local ownership is referred to as both necessary and a challenge. From the *Handbook for Decision Makers* I included chapter 2.3.1 Crisis Management Procedures by Yves de Kermabon with an interest to see, whether any local actors were referred to and in what types of contexts. The chapter is very EU-centered. The included third Handbook is the *Handbook on CSDP*. From this I included chapter 3.3 Challenges for Civilian CSDP Missions written by Kate Fearon and Sophie Picavet, because it was the section containing the most referrals to local

ownership or local actors. Overall, the lack of inclusion of the local level in the Handbooks was surprising.